Measuring fiscal spillovers in EMU and beyond: A Global VAR approach. CEPS Working Paper No. 428 / December 2016 by Belke, Ansgar & Osowski, Thomas
 Ansgar Belke, University of Duisburg-Essen, CEPS, Brussels, and Institute for the 
Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn. Thomas Osowski, University of Duisburg-Essen. 
Corresponding author: Professor Dr. Ansgar Belke, Ad personam Jean Monnet Chair for 
Macroeconomics and Director of the Institute of Business and Economic Studies (IBES), 
University of Essen, email: ansgar.belke@uni-due.de 
Acknowledgments: Funded by the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the 
European Union. Project ID 649261. We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and 
suggestions from Vanessa Smith and her GVAR team, Joscha Beckmann, Daniel Gros, 
and Cinzia Alcidi. We are grateful to Vanessa Smith for making available the GVAR 
2.0 toolbox, which we used for the empirical estimations. We also profited very much 
from participating in the 2013 European Central Bank’s GVAR Workshop. 
CEPS Working Documents are intended to give an indication of work being conducted 
within CEPS’ research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other experts in the 
field. The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent the official position of CEPS. 
 
ISBN 978-94-6138-558-1 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  
© Ansgar Belke and Thomas Osowski 2016 
Measuring fiscal spillovers in EMU 
and beyond: A Global VAR approach 
Ansgar Belke and Thomas Osowski 
No. 428 / December 2016 
Abstract 
This paper identifies and measures fiscal spillovers in the EU countries empirically using a 
global vector autoregression (GVAR) model. Our aim is to look at the sign and the absolute 
values of fiscal spillovers in a country-wise perspective and at the time profile (impulse 
response) of the impacts of fiscal shocks. We find moderate spillover effects of fiscal policy 
shocks originating in Germany and France. However, there is significant variation regarding 
magnitude of the spillovers among destination countries and country clusters. Furthermore, 
we find some evidence that spillovers generated by German or French fiscal spillovers are 
stronger for EMU than non-EMU countries in Europe.  
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1. Introduction 
It is undisputed among economists that the growing interdependence due to a common currency 
and a single monetary policy legitimizes a certain degree of economic policy coordination 
among Euro area Member States. However, empirical analyses have yet offered inconclusive 
evidence with regard to the quantitative importance of different types of economic spillovers. 
In accordance, estimates of the welfare gains arising from economic policy coordination in the 
Euro area have varied considerably (Weyerstrass et al., 2006). 
This paper identifies and measures fiscal spillovers in the EU countries empirically, using a 
global vector autoregression (GVAR) methodology. The GVAR modeling approach has been 
pioneered by Pesaran et al. (2004) and further contributions such as Dees et al. (2007). It allows 
consistent modeling of international interdependencies and transmission channels across coun-
tries and the evaluation of different economic policies in counterfactual analyses. In a nutshell, 
a GVAR model consists of a number of individual country VAR models describing the coun-
try’s economy treating all variables as endogenous. These countries then are consistently linked 
into a single multi-country model using weights relating to the international linkages of each 
country with the other countries in the sample. In this way, international interdependencies can 
be modeled in a transparent fashion and in a way that is both consistent with the theory and 
consistent with the data. The recent crisis can serve as a good example of how global economies 
are highly interlinked via a vast amount of transmission channels demonstrating that foreign 
and global developments have strong effects on national markets. 
Due to a limited amount of observations, econometric approaches, in general, have to keep a 
close eye on the number of parameters, especially when linkages and spillovers between a large 
number of countries and regions are to be examined. The GVAR offers a solution to the so-
called “curse of dimensionality” by dividing variables into three distinct groups: domestic, for-
eign and purely global variables. The foreign variables are treated as weakly exogenous and 
summarize developments in foreign countries and thereby reduce the number of parameters in 
each VAR model. The assumption needs to be tested and is generally held for most of the 
countries – with the exception of the US in several models. The assumption is essential for the 
estimation process, as it allows estimating estimation of the individual country models in a first 
step. Subsequently, the country VARs are stacked together and simultaneously solved (Di 
Mauro and Pesaran, 2013).1  
For our purposes, the individual EU countries, as well as several of the most important 
international trading partners, can be modeled with a special focus on the effects of either sin-
gle-country or coordinated fiscal shocks such as increases in fiscal spending. Fiscal variables 
analyzed in this paper cover variables such as government expenditure, government revenues 
or the government budget balance, all measured as percentage of GDP.  
What is the motivation of this paper? Currently, policy calls for more government spending in 
the Euro area (of countries with some fiscal space). Monetary policy is constrained because its 
arsenal appears to be exhausted. Therefore, fiscal policy may need to be active. If spillovers are 
sufficiently high, output can be stimulated across the monetary union. Potential questions that 
might arise in this context are, therefore: Who is benefiting fiscally from whom in the Euro 
area? Whose spillovers are biggest? Which ones are small (or even negative) (Georgiadis and 
Hollmayr, 2016)? 
Our aim is to look at the sign and the absolute values of fiscal spillovers in a country-wise 
perspective and at the time profile (impulse response) of the impacts of fiscal shocks, i.e. of the 
                                                          
1 A brief and coherent description and explanation of the GVAR methodology is also delivered by Canova and 
Ciccarelli (2013), pp. 39-41. 
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spillovers of a German fiscal expansion on French GDP (as was the aim of, for instance, Gros 
and Hobza, 2001, one and a half decades ago). We differentiate between fiscal shocks in indi-
vidual countries and common Euro area wide shocks which are called “regional” shocks in the 
GVAR analysis. Our analysis is extended to include European economies outside the Euro area 
in order to assess whether, on the one hand, core and peripheral EMU countries and, on the 
other hand, EMU member countries and the “Rest of Europe” react symmetrically to external 
fiscal shocks (Caporale and Girardi, 2011). Special attention will be paid to the question of 
whether spillovers are stronger within the EMU group than within the larger EU group due to 
tighter financial or trade links (Faini, 2006). Why? Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in-
creases the degree of economic interdependence between Euro area Member States.  
Under EMU, the negative impact of interest rate increases in the wake of national fiscal expan-
sions is often said to be limited (which is exactly what we see in our impulse responses of long-
term interest rates within the euro area as a reaction to fiscal shocks in individual EMU member 
countries or to Euro area-wide shock). Let us take the example of Germany for illustration 
purposes. The authority responsible for the conduct of monetary policy is the ECB, which tar-
gets the total money supply of all the members of the Euro area, of which the German GDP is 
approximately slightly beyond one-fourth. Therefore, the interest rate increase following the 
German fiscal expansion will be proportionately lower. The German domestic demand will thus 
be dampened to a lower extent and the positive trade effects can well be expected to play a 
more pronounced role (Gros and Hobza, 2001). In the Euro area, in particular, the single mon-
etary policy, the common external exchange rate and the related absence of bilateral nominal 
exchange rates can thus strengthen spillover effects across Euro area countries (European Com-
mission, 2014). 
Sharing a common currency and a single monetary policy means that there is a higher proba-
bility that economic policies and developments, here: fiscal policies, in one Member State will 
spillover into the rest of the Euro area (as opposed to the “Rest of Europe”). Coordination of 
economic policy instruments across the Member States of a monetary union is seen by some to 
be justified when this kind of spillover is significant.2 Regarding this issue, Article 99 of the 
Treaty imposes on the Member States to treat their economic policies as a matter of common 
concern and to coordinate them in Council with an eye on achieving, among others, higher non-
inflationary growth and an improved standard of living (Weyerstrass et al., 2006).  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 on fiscal spillovers in Europe and GVAR analysis 
provides a brief discussion of the interrelation between fiscal spillovers and fiscal policy coor-
dination in EMU/the EU and reviews the theory and the quantification of fiscal spillovers. The 
data and variables used and the estimation approach are described in section 3. Our GVAR 
estimations and impulse responses are presented in section 4 combined with the results of a 
battery of necessary pre-tests, including some structural break and robustness checks. Section 
5 sums up our results, derives some policy implications and provides an outlook for further 
research. 
 
  
                                                          
2 Later on in this study we will argue that significance of fiscal spillovers may be a necessary but by far not 
sufficient condition of fiscal policy coordination. 
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2. Fiscal spillovers in the Euro area (EU) and GVAR analysis 
2.1 Cross-country spillovers and fiscal policy coordination in EMU/the EU 
Basic considerations 
Economic theory suggests that the justification for fiscal policy coordination is heavily linked 
to the existence of cross-border spillover effects. Exogenous shocks in one country are likely 
to have pronounced effects which are not limited to the domestic economy. (Fiscal) policy de-
cisions can be expected to generate spillover to other countries (as modeled in a GVAR in this 
paper). Therefore, real economic variables, as well as financial variables, may be influenced 
via several different transmission channels such as imports, relative prices, the interest rate 
channel and several others. Of course, the strength of such cross-border effects depends on the 
amount of economic ties, linkages, and the institutional framework. In a monetary union with 
a single monetary policy, a common currency/exchange rate and a high level of integration, 
spillovers can be expected to be particularly substantial (Faini, 2006).3  
While economic policy coordination reduces the discretionary use of fiscal policy by national 
governments, it is argued to increase stability in the entire monetary union. One of the main 
instruments of fiscal policy coordination are fiscal rules. Fiscal rules are not only consistent 
with the rationale for coordination but are also considered to be an integral component of a 
monetary union in order to ensure that instability in one country does not destabilize other 
countries and that monetary policy can be adequate for all member states (Alcidi et al., 2016a). 
Frequently, politicians claim that a common fiscal policy is especially beneficial against the 
background of a common currency. In a monetary union, budgetary laxity in the individual 
Member States negatively affects the other members. If the no-bail-out clause stating that no 
Member State can be forced to step in for another state’s liabilities is not totally credible, there 
are risks that individual fiscal irresponsibility impairs economic performance in the other Mem-
ber States. Extremely profligate fiscal policies in some countries might harm other less profli-
gate members via higher borrowing costs, especially if markets believe that members would 
have to stand in for peers that became insolvent. If this is the case, the profligate members could 
‘free-ride’ on the backs of the others. These negative consequences of irresponsible fiscal pol-
icies could be avoided by coordinated budgetary discipline (Weyerstrass et al., 2006).  
Another popular but opposing approach would be to start from a negative fiscal policy shock, 
particularly a country-specific shock in a big country such as Germany or a negative Euro area-
wide shock, and to argue that negative fiscal spillovers imply “austerity” in the whole Euro area 
(de Grauwe, 2009). If fiscal policy is regarded as a primary source of shocks, independent fiscal 
policies allow for the possibility to diversify macroeconomic risks (Belke and Gros, 2009a and 
2009b). We would like to argue that this view is valid at least in “normal” times but now turn 
to the quantification of fiscal spillovers in Europe. 
 
Definition of spillovers  
Cross-border spillovers are broadly defined as the result of a shock in one economy which is 
transmitted through a vast number of channels to another economy. The definition illustrates 
                                                          
3 Blanchard et al. (2015) show that a fiscal expansion by the core economies of the Euro area would have a large 
and positive impact on periphery GDP assuming that policy rates remain low for a prolonged period. Under their 
preferred large-scale model specification, an expansion of core government spending is equal to one percent of 
Euro area GDP would boost periphery GDP around 1 percent in a liquidity trap lasting three years, about half as 
large as the effect on core GDP. 
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that the quality and quantity of spillover effects depend on several dimensions (European Com-
mission, 2014): the transmission channels, the type of shock and the amplification or stabiliza-
tion mechanisms operating in the originating and receiving economies. 
 
Types of spillovers  
In general, a number of different types of spillover can be distinguished in the Euro area/the 
EU (Weyerstrass et al., 2006):  
External vs. internal spillover: External spillover which we do not specifically focus upon in 
our study originates from interactions between the Euro area and the rest of the world. In par-
ticular, developments in the US economy influence the Euro area economy significantly, espe-
cially via trade linkages and the euro/US dollar exchange rate. Prices of oil and other raw ma-
terials are determined in international markets largely beyond the control of the Euro area but 
having potentially strong spillover on its economies. However, we assess internal spillover 
which originates from the economic linkages between the Euro area countries. 
Shock vs. policy-induced spillover: A policy-induced spillover implies a direct influence of pol-
icy measures (changes in government expenditure, in government revenue and in the govern-
ment budget balance) undertaken on the individual country level on other individual countries. 
Coordination is often recommended to mitigate negative consequences of policy errors and 
internalizes the consequences of spillover from non-coordinated policies (for an opposing view 
in normal times, however, see Belke and Gros, 2009a and 2009b). Policy coordination may also 
be beneficial to address spillover produced by macroeconomic shocks hitting either all Euro 
area countries symmetrically (like oil price shocks) or individual countries (like the German 
unification). In our study, we model a symmetric “regional” shock as, for instance, a simulta-
neous government budget cut in all EMU/EU member countries. 
Direct vs. indirect spillover: In the context of the Euro area/EU, direct and indirect spillover of 
the different countries is present. Direct international spillover operates mainly through trade 
linkages. In addition, indirect spillover working through the common interest rate and the euro 
exchange rate is also important. As an example, an overly expansionary fiscal policy by one 
country may result in higher interest rates, influencing all other Euro area Member States. Fur-
thermore, fiscal policy measures may induce exchange rate reactions affecting all members of 
a monetary union. The empirical GVAR and the dynamic analysis using impulse response func-
tion is able to include direct as well as indirect channels of transmission. However, the GVAR 
approach is not capable of a clean distinction between the two.  
Positive vs. negative spillover: In the case of a positive spillover, individual policies reinforce 
each other. In the case of negative spillovers, policy measures are mutually inconsistent and in 
conflict with each other. Obviously, this difference has implications for the design of coordina-
tion. In the presence of negative spillovers, there is a stronger need for monitoring, corrective 
mechanisms, and sanctions in case of noncompliance. While there is often a clear theoretical 
notion why a certain spillover is likely to be positive or negative, empirical estimations of spill-
overs may not always confirm theoretical priors. The interactions of spillovers, and in some 
cases (but not in the GVAR exercise in this study) also non-linearities and the complexity of 
dynamics may lead to more indeterminate outcomes concerning sign, size and the timing of 
spillover. 
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Factors amplifying or mitigating spillovers  
Various conditions influence the propagation of national shocks which can either strengthen or 
weaken cross-border effects (e.g. the degree of trade openness). Obviously, a high degree of 
trade openness can be expected to further increase spillover effects. Nominal and real rigidities 
also play an important role for the amplitude and persistence of spillover effects, affecting the 
adjustment to shocks (European Commission, 2014). 
Regarding financial spillovers, their extent depends on a large variety of factors, such as "the 
degree of international portfolio diversification, the degree of prevailing risk aversion, the size 
and activity of multinational banks, access to funding, the degree of financial market integra-
tion and the nature of financial market regulations (European Commission, 2014). What is 
more, governance structure, fiscal and monetary policy regime (continuity, in particular, the 
existence or absence of supranational risk sharing mechanisms) appear to play a major role. 
Some even mention distance and common language in this context (Bankowski, 2016, Georgi-
adis and Hollmayr (2016), Slide 10: Determinants of spillovers). 
Finally, the stance of monetary policy is also expected to influence spillover effects (Elekdag 
and Muir, 2014, Gadatsch et al., 2016): Simulations depicted by In’t Veld (2016) generate evi-
dence that debt-financed increases in government investment in surplus countries have stronger 
positive GDP spillovers to other member states of the Euro area when monetary policy rates 
are held constant (e.g. when monetary policy is operating at the lower zero bound) (In’t Veld, 
2016). Bundesbank (2016) and Cook and Devereux (2016) assess the role of monetary policy 
for fiscal spillovers in the context of a currency union.4 
 
2.2 Literature review: theory and quantification of fiscal spillovers 
2.2.1 Fiscal spillovers and transmission channels 
A fiscal policy impulse in one economy can affect other economies via multiple channels. The 
primary channels reviewed in the literature are the demand channel (also called trade channel), 
the competitiveness channel (also called terms of trade channel) and the financial markets chan-
nel. (Alcidi et al, 2016a). See Weyerstrass et al. (2006) for a detailed discussion. All transmis-
sion channels are contained in the GVAR through estimated cointegration vectors within the 
GVAR estimated by us (for details see section 3). 
The demand channel is the one that has been emphasized the most (In‘t Veld, 2016). As fiscal 
policy actions influence domestic demand, this should also affect (domestic) demand for for-
eign goods and thereby (net-) exports of trading partners. This channel is commonly related to 
budgetary policies. For instance, through the demand channel, a fiscal stimulus in one country 
may stimulate aggregate demand in other countries (Alcidi et al., 2016b, Bundesbank, 2016, 
European Commission, 2014, and Weyerstrass et al., 2006, who speak of the “output channel” 
in this context). This is in a nutshell what Elekdag and Muir (2014) and Hebous and Zimmer-
mann (2013) refer to as “positive spillover effects through trade”. Under a regime of flexible 
exchange rates, a fiscal expansion increases domestic economic activity and also generates 
pressure on the exchange rate to appreciate and the domestic interest rate to increase. 
                                                          
4 The impact of many of these “conditioning” interaction variables on the fiscal spillovers could best be investi-
gated in a panel analysis but not in a basic GVAR of the Dees et al. (2007)-type used in our study (Georgiadis and 
Hollmayr, 2016). Fahri and Werning (2012), Cook and Devereux (2016), and Fujiwara and Ueda (2013) have 
analysed fiscal spillovers in a liquidity trap. However, they utilise theoretical models but do not employ Global 
VARs. 
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In a monetary union, the exchange rate (between the member states) is fixed while the interest 
rate is not determined at national, but union level. When domestic money under circulation 
increases, this stimulates domestic output. The subsequent increase in domestic output raises 
imports and therefore also the income of other countries. 
The competitiveness channel represents the second potential channel of fiscal spillovers. Its 
first variants are the interest rate and exchange rate channel. In the Euro area, fiscal policies 
can (at least potentially, if the ECB does not accommodate) induce changes in the short-term 
interest rates and the exchange rate of the euro, leading to interest rate and exchange rate spill-
over through the “interest rate channel” and the “exchange rate channel”. This spillover within 
the Euro area gives support for the standard “beggar-thy-neighbor” argument for policy coor-
dination which makes possible the internalization of the negative spillover from fiscal policies 
through these channels. It is also important to realize that Euro area member countries are likely 
to differ in the spillover they experience from changes in the common short-term interest rate 
and the euro exchange rate (Bundesbank, 2016, Elekdag and Muir, 2014, In‘t Veld, 2016 and 
Weyerstrass et al., 2006). 
A fiscal stimulus is also eventually affecting the terms of trade by increasing inflation in the 
source country, which serves as an example of the competitiveness channel. Hebous and Zim-
mermann (2013) and Weyerstrass et al. (2006) call this the “spillover effects through the real 
exchange rate”: the euro is floating with respect to the rest of the world. If the fiscal expansion 
in a (large) member economy causes an appreciation of the real exchange rate of the Euro, as 
the Mundell-Fleming model predicts, the expansionary effects of a fiscal expansion will be 
decreased due to worsening trade balances. 
The competitiveness channel may be relevant for so-called structural fiscal policies. Due to 
distortionary taxation, fiscal policies are likely to influence relative prices and therefore the 
terms of trade (Ferrero, 2009). Furthermore, fiscal policies can be designed to primarily target 
the terms of trade. Such a policy is called fiscal devaluation and describes a policy which for 
example leads to an increase in VAT while payroll taxes are reduced (Alcidi et al., 2016b). 
Structural fiscal policies – apart from fiscal devaluation – which increase the labor supply may 
also generate spillover effects via the competitiveness channel (Alcidi et al., 2016, European 
Commission, 2014).  
A couple of distinct mechanisms are related to the financial market channel. The typical and 
primary transmission mechanism are interest rates in different market segments as well as pol-
icy rates. A currently important mechanism is that excessive government borrowing in one 
country can increase risk premia of sovereign debt in other member states of a monetary union. 
Markets may anticipate that a commitment to a no bail-out rule is not credible implying that 
member countries are to some extent liable for the sovereign debt of all other member countries. 
However, even if the commitment is credible, the risk of financial contagion may increase risk 
premia in other countries – particularly via weakened financial intermediation. Spillover effects 
might be especially substantial when sovereign debt is at a high level and the additional fiscal 
expansion is debt-financed. To a certain extent, these concerns are also relevant for private debt 
not only because it has partly become public debt during the financial crisis (Alcidi et al., 2016b 
and Thirion, 2016, Caporale and Girardi, 2011, European Commission, 2014).  
The working mechanisms of the previous channels are usually demonstrated in the GVAR lit-
erature in a multi-country Mundell-Fleming model with a fixed exchange rate peg between 
members and perfect capital mobility (Hebous and Zimmermann, 2013 European Commission, 
2014). 
Different forms of financial market integration are also a source of cross-country spillover ef-
fects. In the Euro area, financial integration has led to increased cross-border banking exposure. 
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Therefore, foreign claims of banks may work as amplifiers of fiscal policy shocks (Alcidi et al., 
2016a, Caporale and Girardi, 2011, European Commission, 2014).  
Another important aspect is the relation between self-fulfilling government debt crises and cen-
tral banks acting as lenders of last resort for governments.5 According to Aguiar et al. (2015), 
there is a fiscal externality. Their argument contains that a small country of a monetary union 
might ignore the impact its borrowing decisions on inflation expectations via the credibility of 
the central bank’s inflation target (Alcidi et al., 2016a).  
 
Quantifying fiscal spillover effects 
From a theoretical perspective, the demand for fiscal coordination is based on the existence of 
cross-border spillovers combined with some type of market imperfections. In order to identify 
and measure cross-border spillovers, it is essential to pay attention to the condition of the econ-
omy and underlying market frictions. However, the quantification of spillovers remains chal-
lenging in practice and the literature does not deliver a clear-cut answer. In the following, we 
present empirical results of the literature and focus on differences between the empirical ap-
proaches (for a much larger survey of the non-GVAR literature see Alcidi et al., 2016a) 
In’t Veld (2016) depicts several model simulations which confirm that a debt-financed increase 
in government investment (in surplus countries) will have positive output spillovers to the rest 
of the Euro area. The results indicate that spillovers are especially large if monetary policy 
operates at a fixed interest rate floor (e.g. at the lower zero bound). The results of the model 
simulations show that an increase in productive spending in Germany and the Netherlands can 
not only raise output in these countries but also have substantial positive cross-border effects 
on the remaining member states of the EMU, while the effects on current accounts are likely to 
be small. The effects can be strongly facilitated by directing investments to the most profitable 
projects. Due to the historically low cost of borrowing, debt-financed fiscal actions by surplus 
countries will only cause small increases in government debt but might generate an improve-
ment in debt ratios in the rest of the Euro area. Similar results are derived by Bundesbank 
(2016). 
Given the need to upgrade and replace aging infrastructure, higher German public investment 
is demanded by Elekdag and Muir (2014). The authors argue that this will not only generate 
short-term effects by increasing domestic demand and reducing the current account surplus but 
will also increase output in the long-run as well as generate beneficial regional spillovers. In 
the background of an accommodative monetary policy stance, the expansionary effects of 
higher public investment are further strengthened. The current low-interest rate environment 
presents a window of opportunity to finance higher public investment at historically favorable 
rates.  
The studies by In‘t Veld (2016), Elekdag and Muir (2014) and Bundesbank (2016) share one 
common implication: Spillover effects of public investment expenditure in surplus countries 
are negligible as far as monetary policy reaction is rule-based. If the monetary policy stance 
before the fiscal stimulus was appropriate, the new situation would necessitate an increase in 
the policy rates (or a less intensive use of unconventional monetary policy measures) (Bundes-
bank, 2016). 
In their seminal study, Weyerstrass et al. (2006) assess the nature of economic interdependence 
under European Economic and Monetary Union. Its main contribution is to provide plausible 
estimates of the sign and size of economic spillover from budgetary consolidation and/or struc-
tural reforms in a large Member State or in the EMU as a whole. A combination of empirical 
                                                          
5 See De Grauwe (2011) for a detailed discussion on this issue. 
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methods is employed in this study. Vector autoregression analysis is used to explore the inter-
play between government borrowing, public debt and short- and long-term interest rates. Panel 
data techniques are applied to investigate the link between structural reform and economic per-
formance. Structural models are used to estimate the cross-country spillover from budgetary 
consolidation and structural reforms and the interaction between these policies (Weyerstrass et 
al., 2006). 
Their analysis of short-run budgetary spillover in the aggregate Euro area suggests that a reduc-
tion in the budget deficit results in a small but positive effect on output. This result suggests the 
prevalence of positive non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidation (a result which we will not 
be able to corroborate in section 4). Crowding in effects and positive supply-side effects from 
fiscal consolidations are the most intuitive explanations for this finding. A fiscal consolidation 
in the Euro area only weakly affects short-term interest rates and inflation (a result which we 
will come up with in section 4 as well, at least with regard to inflation). The disaggregated 
analysis reveals that in most cases there are significant positive direct output and inflation spill-
over effects for the rest of the Euro area. Moreover, Member States display substantial differ-
ences in the spillover from fiscal consolidations in the Euro area (as confirmed by our results 
for the effect of a “regional” shock in section 4 later on). These differences can be explained by 
diverging trade links, the size of the economies, and initial fiscal conditions (Weyerstrass et al., 
2006). 
The analysis of long-term budgetary spillover in the Euro area finds that, with the exception of 
highly indebted countries, rising government debt in one Member State has a weak impact on 
long-term interest rates. Aggregate Euro area responses, on the contrary, are stronger than for 
the individual Member States. This means that rising debt levels in the Euro area as a whole 
will “crowd out” private investment through higher long-term interest rates. This provides a 
strong argument for economic policy coordination in the Euro area since a coordinated budget-
ary consolidation by the Member States will yield lower long-term interest rates (Weyerstrass 
et al., 2006). 
Taking the Weyerstrass et al. (2006) study as a starting point, we now turn to the results of 
further empirical studies which try to quantify fiscal spillover effects.  
 
Fiscal spillovers: evidence from Global VARs 
The GVAR (Pesaran et al., 2004, Dees et al., 2007) was developed for the purpose of capturing 
spillovers in multi-country analyses, where a particular structure on the strength of interdepend-
encies is imposed. Each country-specific VAR is augmented with a foreign factor, calculated 
as a weighted average of foreign variables according to economic or financial bilateral links. 
The GVAR is a large constrained VAR, where restrictions arise as a result of the weights im-
posed on foreign variables, as well as from the exogeneity of each foreign factor with respect 
to the long-run parameters of the corresponding domestic VAR (Bicu and Lieb, 2015). Since 
the GVAR is designed to be used in applications with a large cross-sectional dimension, these 
exogeneity assumptions can be interpreted as no long-run feedback from any individual country 
(except the dominant unit) to the dynamics of the foreign factor.  
While the GVAR has some appealing features, a series of concerns have been raised regarding 
the factorization of the joint density for the domestic and foreign variables (see Ericsson, 2011). 
Furthermore, imposing weak exogeneity restrictions and estimating each country-specific VAR 
independently may not be justified for our empirical analysis, given that we include a small 
number of countries that are strongly interconnected. The implications of the underlying re-
strictions for the dynamics of the system and for the transmission of shocks across countries are 
difficult to assess (Bicu and Lieb, 2015).  
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Although the model is based on the restrictive assumption that foreign variables are weakly 
exogenous in the long-run, this assumption can be tested in order to assess whether the assump-
tion is justified. Despite its restrictions, we believe that the GVAR approach delivers an ade-
quate solution to cope with the curse of dimensionality which is always present if dynamics 
within and across a large number of countries are examined. 
So far, papers using GVAR for studying spillovers of national fiscal shocks and of coordinated 
fiscal policies are still scarce. Hebous and Zimmermann (2013), Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-
Hernández (2014) and Dragomirescu-Gaina and Philippas (2015), Caporale and Girardi (2011), 
Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2013) and Georgiadis and Hollmayr (2016) employ GVAR ap-
proaches with rich model specifications in order to analyse spillovers stemming from shocking 
Euro area fiscal variables. They conclude by underlining the need for fiscal coordination due to 
greater economic consequences of an area-wide fiscal shock compared to country-specific 
shocks. 
Hebous and Zimmermann (2013) estimate spillover effects of a fiscal shock in one member 
country in the Euro area on the output of the remaining members, employing the Global Vector 
Autoregression (GVAR) model of Dees et al. (2007) and Pesaran et al. (2004). Closely follow-
ing the seminal GVAR paper by Dees et al. (2007), they compare the impacts of a domestic 
fiscal shock with those of a similar size6 area-wide shock expressed as a weighted average of 
the fiscal shocks across all member countries. This is exactly the way in which we also specify 
fiscal policy shocks in section 4. According to their estimates, the impact of a Euro area-wide 
fiscal shock on the output of a member country turns out to be positive and larger than the 
spillover of a domestic fiscal shock. In a nutshell, their policy conclusions run as follows. If 
each Euro area member country contributes to the Euro area-wide shock in accordance with the 
size of this country, this is less costly from the perspective of a Euro area member country and 
also more effective or at least not less effective than a domestic fiscal shock. This indicates the 
importance of coordinated fiscal actions. Seen on the whole, thus, the results by Hebous and 
Zimmermann (2013) indicate that there are considerable differences in countries’ reactions to 
fiscal actions depending on whether these are internationally coordinated or not. 
Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández (2014) empirically assess the economic consequences 
of shocks to fiscal variables in the EU countries from the domestic and global perspective. For 
this purpose, they specify and estimate a GVAR for 14 countries of the former EU15 and the 
United States, employing quarterly macroeconomic, monetary and fiscal data from 1978 to 
2009. Unlike other GVAR models with fiscal variables, they consider total public receipts and 
total public expenditure separately – a way of modeling which we also apply in our study (in 
addition to including the government balance as Hebous and Zimmermann, 2012, 2013, do). 
What is more, they model not only the Euro area economies but, beyond that, all countries of 
the former EU15 (except Luxembourg) and the United States. However, in our study, we even 
reach beyond Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández (2014) and include European countries 
which are neither members of the EMU nor the EU (“Rest of Europe”). The simulation results 
of Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández (2014) reveal that the responses of real GDP to a 
negative (positive) domestic/global shock to total public expenditure (total public receipts) are 
negative (positive) for the countries under investigation. The impacts of domestic fiscal shocks 
are larger in the country of origin of the fiscal shock, whereas their spillover effects are limited 
(contrary to the majority of our results). This is something we will visualize in section 4 based 
on so-called heat maps. The impacts of global shocks show a significant degree of similarity 
                                                          
6 This implies that the simulated area-wide fiscal shock does not correspond to a Euro area-wide fiscal shock which 
consists of shocking each country-specific fiscal variable with one standard deviation.  
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in, as the authors express it, “the cyclical behavior of the European economies”. As policy rec-
ommendations, they suggest “boosting the slow process of coordination of fiscal actions in the 
EU in order to avoid unwanted economic consequences”. 
Dragomirescu-Gaina and Philippas (2015) estimate a global vector autoregressive (global VAR 
or GVAR) model in the spirit of Dees et al. (2007) and draw policy implications based on 
impulse response functions and variance decomposition methods. They take advantage of a 
particular feature of the GVAR modelling framework that allows us to distinguish whether the 
dynamics of the public sectors in Europe are subject to some common unobserved factors, 
which might stem from elements not included in the model or not identifiable in the available 
data (e.g. policy compromises, consensus reached in Brussels etc.). This type of identification 
differentiates their paper from other studies employing similar empirical methodologies or ad-
dressing related topics. 
An innovative study, although not published yet and only available by presentation slides, is 
Georgiadis and Hollmayr (2016). They estimate a Mixed-Cross-Section Global VAR (MCS-
GVAR) to quantify “of all fiscal spillovers within the Euro area” for the time period 1999Q1 
to 2009Q4. Different from our study, their empirical GVAR model includes an additional panel 
component (as a, as we think, promising avenue for further research in the area of GVAR-
modelling of fiscal spillovers). The included variables are: GDP, inflation (CPI), government 
spending, short-term interest rates, the oil price, the real exchange rate. The countries they in-
clude are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain (and 46 countries outside of Euro Area). According to their results, spillovers are heter-
ogeneous and rather small (e.g. from Germany). Openness and higher order spillovers are main 
determinants for spillovers. The fiscal position and the current account of the receiving country 
play a role, too. However, the authors are faced with the following restrictions: there are no 
non-linearities, there is no crisis-period, and there are not more endogenous country variables 
in the GVAR possible.7 
The following studies are less close to ours because they still use GVAR models to model fiscal 
spillovers but do not look at spillovers of changes in the government budgets. Instead, they look 
at the international linkages government bond yields and somewhat indirectly draw some con-
clusions regarding the necessity of fiscal policy coordination in the Euro area or Europe in 
general.  
Caporale and Girardi (2011) empirically assess the dynamic impacts of fiscal imbalances in a 
specific EMU member state on the borrowing costs of its partner countries. They estimate a 
Global VAR employing quarterly data for the EMU period. The results suggest that euro‐de-
nominated government yields are strongly correlated with each other. But financial markets 
turn out to be capable of discriminating among different issuers. The authors conclude that 
fiscal imbalances in Italy and in other economies in the Euro area periphery should thus be 
closely monitored by their EMU counterparts and the European institutions. 
A related study by Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2013), whose focus is broader than the European 
focus of the other studies sketched above, investigates the international spillover effects of fis-
cal shocks. The authors investigate the effect of fiscal spending shocks on financial variables 
such as equity prices, government bond yields and corporate bond yields. For this purpose, they 
utilize the GVAR methodology for 8 countries, employing quarterly data for the sample period 
1980Q1-2008Q4. According to their empirical results, fiscal shocks induce significant domestic 
and international spillover effects on financial variables. A shock to government consumption 
in a (large) country whose government bonds are considered as nearly risk-free generates a 
boost to equity prices and government bond yields on the domestically and the international 
                                                          
7 Georgiadis and Hollmayr (2016) is discussed by Bankowski (2016). 
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level. Conversely, for peripheral countries, a shock to government consumption causes an in-
crease in domestic government bond yields and decreases yields in larger neighboring countries 
with risk-free government bonds. While fiscal spending increases, equity prices in peripheral 
countries decrease. Finally, a shock to government bond yields spills over to the domestic and 
international corporate bond markets, especially if the shock is originating in a large country. 
A somewhat more indirect approach is taken by Canova (2013). He develops an extension to 
existing GVAR models to capture time-varying interdependence between financial variables 
related to fiscal policy. He measures fiscal spillovers by modeling the time-varying pattern of 
co-movements among spreads. His starting point is that government bond spreads in the Euro 
area reveal a time-varying pattern of co-movement which represents a serious challenge for 
econometric modeling and forecasting. As expressed by the author: “(t)his pattern of the data 
is not captured by the standard specification that model spreads as persistent processes reverting 
to a time-varying mean determined by two factors: a local factor, driven by fiscal fundamentals 
and growth, and a global world factor, driven by the market’s appetite for risk. This paper ar-
gues that a third factor, expectations of exchange rate devaluation, gained traction during the 
crises. This factor is well captured via an estimated GVAR which models the interdependence 
among spreads by making each country’s spread function of global European spreads. Global 
spreads capture the exposure of each country’s spread to other spreads in the Euro area in terms 
of the time-varying ‘distance’ between their fiscal fundamentals.” Interestingly enough, the new 
specification developed in this paper dominates the standard one in modeling the time-varying 
pattern of co-movements among spreads and the response of Euro area spreads to the Greek 
debt crisis. 
 
2.2.2 Magnitude and time profile of fiscal spillovers 
The size and the sign of intra-EMU spillovers of fiscal policies cannot be accurately determined 
since they are susceptible to a considerable number of uncertainties (Caporale and Girardi, 
2011). First, the results of theoretical considerations do not provide a firm indication of the 
extent of spillovers. The trade linkages, which are a channel of positive transmission of in-
creased government spending across the borders, are counteracted by the functioning of capital 
market linkages that incorporate an influence of the Euro area-wide interest rate and common 
currency exchange rate. As a result, the two effects usually work in opposite directions which 
diminish the absolute size of the spillovers and create uncertainty regarding the sign of the 
eventual effect (Caporale and Girardi, 2011, Gros and Hobza, 2001). 
Second, many particular circumstances pertaining to the fiscal expansion will have an impact 
on the direction and magnitude of spillover effects. As Laxton et al. (1998) argue “there is no 
such thing as a pure fiscal shock”. The short-run impact of fiscal policies is strongly influenced 
by the stance of monetary policy followed by the central bank (which is commonly only indi-
rectly modelled in the standard GVAR through its impact on the long-term interest rate) by the 
particular way in which the fiscal policy is conducted and also by the mode in which it is fi-
nanced. 
Third, one could argue, that under EMU the spillovers would grow stronger as the interactions 
between countries become more intensive (see above). For example, it is often expected that 
the role of intra-EMU trade will further increase as a consequence of declining of contract costs 
(Belke and Gros, 1999). However, it is difficult to assess whether the change will be significant 
enough to override the impact of interest rate movements. In the case of fiscal expansion, which 
takes place through government spending, the increase in the intensity of trade links may reduce 
the negative impact of higher interest rates and thus even reduces the absolute size of the spill-
over effects. This indicates that the size of spillovers may even decline (Gros and Hobza, 2001). 
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The fourth type of uncertainty arises from the structure of the models themselves which will 
necessarily influence the results of estimates. As shown, the results of simulations vary signif-
icantly which can be attributed to different preferences that the modelers had when building the 
models. The most obvious difference can be spotted in the case of the Marmotte model (run by 
CEPII, Paris), which lacks short-term Keynesian dynamics. This leads to inefficiency of do-
mestic fiscal policy and a different pattern of spillovers compared to the other models (Gros 
and Hobza, 2001). 
Nevertheless, we will give it a try in spite of these uncertainties, without forgetting about im-
portant lessons from an early literature survey. Large differences in the results of simulations 
with respect to the size and sometimes also the sign of spillovers makes it very difficult to 
determine the domestic and cross-border effects of economic policies. This makes the coordi-
nation very complicated and maybe unfeasible as the policy-makers do not know the ‘true’ 
model according to which they could coordinate their economic policies. As some studies indi-
cate (Mooslechner and Schuerz, 1999) a bad choice of the model can even have welfare-de-
creasing consequences. Moreover, the currently used models are calibrated with the use of his-
torical data for the last couple of decades. If some structural characteristics of economies change 
as a result of the functioning of the monetary union, the outcomes of the model simulations may 
be considerably different from the reality (Gros and Hobza, 2001). 
A large number of economic studies are concerned with the impact of the exchange rate regime 
on the cross-border externalities. A simple comparison of the spillover effects under the prede-
cessor of the monetary union – the EMS – may be useful in the discussion regarding the need 
for economic policy coordination in EMU as it indicates that the spillovers might in fact be 
lower under EMU than they used to be under the system of fixed exchange rates (Gros and 
Hobza, 2001). 
The recent empirical results of large-scale macro-econometric models do not seem to provide 
conclusive evidence concerning the nature of the cross-border spillovers of fiscal policies in 
EMU. In most cases, their absolute size is rather small. However, when the average figures are 
disaggregated, it becomes evident that spillovers vary considerably among countries – not only 
with respect to the magnitude but also to the sign. Therefore, it seems improbable that the EMU 
members would take up the cross-border externalities as a serious argument for the further de-
velopment of fiscal policy coordination. It is also unlikely that the countries could agree on a 
concrete mechanism that would be advantageous for all (Gros and Hobza, 2001).  
In the following, we check whether a full-fledged GVAR model is delivering a somewhat 
clearer picture on the quantitative importance of fiscal spillovers in Europe. 
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3. Data and empirical approach 
3.1 Variables and data sources 
We estimate a GVAR model for the following 20 countries: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Can-
ada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. These 
countries have been carefully selected: according to the latest statistics, in 2015, they accounted 
for roughly 45% of global GDP measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Due to our 
research question, we primarily focus our analysis on European countries. However, we did not 
take into account further economies that belong to the EU28 because data availability is limited 
to a short period, or statistical quality does not comply with required standards.  
Our estimation period ranges from 1995Q1 to 2015Q4. We do not include earlier observations 
in order to avoid the modeling of too many structural breaks (e.g. the German reunification 
etc.). The countries contained in our analysis are:  
As a measure of economic activity, we closely follow the common approach in the fiscal spill-
over GVAR literature to use GDP in constant prices (rgdp). In this regard, we primarily use 
quarterly and seasonally adjusted data from the IMF IFS database8. Data is available for the 
following countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the 
US. We complement our sample with OECD9 data for the following countries: Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. For Ireland, we use 
seasonally adjusted data published by Oxford Economics. 
As a measure of price developments, we use the GDP deflator (defl). For the following coun-
tries, we use seasonally adjusted data from the IMF IFS database10: Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Because is not 
available for all countries under observation, we use data from the OECD11 for the remaining 
countries. 
The 10-year interest yield (ltir) is employed as a variable measuring the costs of fiscal lending 
as well as a monetary variable in our framework. Corresponding data is obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream.12  
As fiscal variables, we use nominal fiscal expenditure (exp) and fiscal revenue (rev) as percent 
of nominal GDP. Both variables are obtained from Oxford Economics. With respect to season-
ality, we find evidence for the time series of Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, 
the UK and the US. The procedure presented by Smith and Galesi (2014) is used to eliminate 
seasonal effects from the time series. Additionally, we use the cyclically adjusted government 
primary balance, as a percentage of potential GDP. The variable is obtained from OECD eco-
nomic database.13 Because only annual data is available for this variable, cubic spline interpo-
lation is used to obtain quarterly data.  
Additionally, we include exchange rate indices published by the Bank of international Settle-
ments (BIS) in our basic specifications. According to the BIS, the (broad) indices comprise of 
                                                          
8 Concept: GDP, real index, quarterly, seasonally adjusted, base year (2010=100). 
9 Concept: GDP, VIXOBSA, Volume Index, OECD reference year (=2010), seasonally adjusted. 
10 Concept: GDP, Deflator, Seasonally adjusted, Index. 
11 Concept: DOBSA, Deflator, OECD reference year (=2010), seasonally adjusted. 
12 We do not include the long-term interest rate for Greece because its gyrations are in significant sub-time periods 
(Troika programs, see Alcidi et al., 2016) not market-based and could not be dealt with and corrected within our 
estimated GVAR model. Other studies in the field are proceeding similarly (see, for instance, Ricci-Risquete and 
Ramajo-Hernández, 2015). 
13 Variable code: NLGXQA. 
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61 countries and are calculated as geometric weighted averages of the bilateral exchange rate. 
As we use of real indices, the indices are adjusted by relative consumer prices. 
Regarding transformations of the variables, we follow Dees et al. (2007) and take all variables 
except the interest rate and the fiscal variables in logarithms. Whereas we do not transform the 
latter, we transform the (annualized) interest rate measure into quarterly measures following 
the procedure of Smith and Galesi (2014).  
A key feature of our GVAR model is the calculation of foreign variables for each country in 
the sample using a weighting matrix which captures international linkages across the countries 
in the sample. Like most existing studies, we use trade data published by the IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics database. It can of course not be ruled out that the used variables are not appro-
priate proxies for the respective channels of fiscal policy transmission (Gros and Hobza, 2001). 
It seems that the QUEST model gives priority to the trade flows, whereas in the NiGEM capital 
markets play a more important role (Gros and Hobza, 2001). 
For the construction of regions and therefore the aggregation of country-specific VAR, we use 
the average of national GDP in purchasing power parity terms in current international dollars 
between 2009 and 2012. The corresponding data is published by the World Bank14.  
 
3.2 The global vector autoregressive (GVAR) framework 
The GVAR framework combines the estimation of country-specific VECM models which in-
clude national as well as foreign variables. Due to the curse of dimensionality, it is not possible 
to include every single foreign variable into every country-specific VECM model. Therefore, 
foreign “star” variables are individually generated for every country-specific VECM model as 
weighted averages of the other country’s variables. Furthermore, the GVAR allows to include 
global variables as well as deterministic components.15  
Following Dees et al. (2007), we assume that our model includes 𝑁 + 1 countries which are 
indexed by 𝑖 = 0,1,2, … , 𝑁. Setting the lag order for domestic and foreign variables to two, we 
obtain the VARX* (2,2) model:  
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖𝑜 + 𝑎𝑖1𝑡 + 𝛩𝑖1𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛩𝑖2𝑥𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛬𝑖0𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝛬𝑖1𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
∗ + 𝛬𝑖2𝑥𝑖𝑡−2
∗ + 𝑢𝑖𝑡     (1) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑡: 𝑘𝑖 x 1 vector of domestic variables; 𝛩𝑖𝑙: 𝑘𝑖  𝑥 𝑘𝑖 matrix of lagged coefficients 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ : 𝑘𝑖
∗ x 1 vector of foreign variables; 𝛬𝑖𝑙: 𝑘𝑖  𝑥 𝑘𝑖
∗ 𝑚atrix of coefficients associated with the 
foreign variables; 𝑢𝑖𝑡: 𝑘𝑖  𝑥 1 vector of idiosyncratic shocks;  𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=0 ; 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0. 
As shown above, the country-specific foreign variables are based on weights which are sup-
posed to reflect the relative importance of economic developments in country 𝑗 for country 𝑖.  
The VARX*(2,2) can be written in its error correction form (VECMX*(2,2)) as follows:  
𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖0 + 𝛿𝑖𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛬𝑖0𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝛬𝑖1𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    (2) 
                                                          
14 Concept: NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD. 
15 See Dees et al. (2007) for a more comprehensive derivation of the GVAR model. For a variety of concise 
derivations in the context of fiscal spillovers see Dragomirescu-Gaina and Philippas (2015), pp. 52-55, Caporale 
and Girardi (2011), pp. 4-8, Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2011), Niehof (2014), pp. 6-10, Koukouritakis et al. (2015), 
pp. 3-5, Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández (2014), pp. 1593-1595, Hebous and Zimmermann (2012), pp. 5-6 
including the interpretation of fiscal shocks in Hebous and Zimmermann (2012), pp. 6-8. 
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Where 𝑧𝑖𝑡  = (𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ )′ and 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 representing the error correction terms corresponding to 
the 𝑟𝑖 cointegration relationships of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ country model. The framework allows for the pos-
sibility of cointegration both within 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and between 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ , and consequently across 𝑥𝑖𝑡 
and 𝑥𝑗𝑡 for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.  
Regarding the estimation of the country-specific VARX* models, the main assumption is the 
weak exogeneity of 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  with respect to the model’s long-run properties. As depicted by Dees et 
al. (2007), 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  is assumed to be „long-run forcing” for 𝑥𝑖𝑡 implying that the error correction 
terms of the country-specific VECMX* models do not significantly affect 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ . This aspect is 
closely connected with the assumption that the idiosyncratic shocks of the country-specific 
models should only be weakly correlated cross-sectionally. Therefore, it is assumed that 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑢𝑖𝑡) → 0 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑁 →  ∞. We follow the approach of Dees et al. (2005) to test the as-
sumption of weak exogeneity of the foreign variables by 1) testing the joint signiﬁcance of the 
estimated error correction terms in auxiliary equations for the country-speciﬁc foreign variables 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  and 2) by examining the average pairwise cross-section correlations between VECMX* 
residuals and the domestic variables of the other countries. Economically, the weak exogeneity 
assumption is closely linked with the assumption that all countries are small relative to the size 
of the whole group of countries and therefore the world.  
Once the individual country models are estimated separately, which is possible because of the 
weak exogeneity assumption discussed above, the GVAR model is solved simultaneously. Af-
ter the estimation of the VECMX* models, the cointegration rank is obtained and the corre-
sponding VARX* models are recovered. Based on the VARX*(𝑝𝑖, 𝑞𝑖) model and assuming that 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖 for reasons of simplicity:  
𝐴𝑖0𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖0 + 𝑎𝑖1𝑡 + 𝐴𝑖1𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑧𝑖𝑡−𝑝    (3) 
Where 𝑧𝑖𝑡 = (𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ )′;  𝐴𝑖0 = (𝐼𝑘𝑖, −𝛬𝑖0) and 𝐴𝑖𝑗 = (𝛩𝑖𝑗, 𝐴𝑖𝑗) for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝𝑖. 
Using the matrix containing the weights 𝑤𝑖𝑗  for the construction of the country-specific foreign 
variables (also called “link matrix”) 𝑊𝑖, we obtain:  
𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝑊𝑖𝑥𝑡            (4)  
Where 𝑥𝑡 = (𝑥0𝑡
′ , 𝑥1𝑡
′ , … , 𝑥𝑁𝑡
′ )′ contains all endogenous variables of the entire system and 𝑊𝑖 is 
a (𝑘𝑖 𝑥 𝑘𝑖
∗) ∗ 𝑘 matrix and 𝑘 = ∑ 𝑘𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=0 .  
In this regard, the link matrix allows the country-specific models to be written in terms of the 
global variable vector 𝑥𝑡. After inserting the new expression for 𝑧𝑖𝑡, the individual models are 
stacked to obtain the model for 𝑥𝑡:  
𝐺0𝑥𝑡 = 𝑎𝑜 + 𝑎1𝑡 + 𝐺1𝑥𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐺𝑝𝑥𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑢𝑡    (5) 
where 𝐺0 = (𝐴00𝑊0, 𝐴10𝑊1, … , 𝐴𝑁0𝑊𝑁)′; 𝐺𝑗 = (𝐴0𝑗𝑊0, 𝐴1𝑗𝑊1, … , 𝐴𝑁𝑗𝑊𝑁)′ for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝 
𝑎0 = (𝑎00, 𝑎10, … , 𝑎𝑁0)′; 𝑎1 = (𝑎01, 𝑎11, … , 𝑎𝑁1)
′; 𝑢𝑡 = (𝑎00, 𝑎10, … , 𝑎𝑁0)′ and  
𝑝 = max (max 𝑝𝑖, max 𝑞𝑖).  
Because all variables are now combined in one system, we can analyze the effects of a shock 
to a domestic variable in country 𝑖 on other domestic variables as well as variables of other 
countries. After multiplying the equation by 𝐺𝑜
−1 whose elements contain only the known link 
matrices and the estimated parameters of the country-by-country estimations, we obtain the 
GVAR(𝑝) model:  
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑡 + 𝐹1𝑥𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐹𝑝𝑥𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑒𝑡,    (6) 
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where 𝑏0 = 𝐺𝑜
−1𝑎0, 𝑏1 = 𝐺0
−1𝑎1, 𝐹𝑗 = 𝐺0
−1, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝; 𝑒𝑡 = 𝐺0
−1𝑢𝑡. 
As pointed out by Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2013), the GVAR models interactions among the 
economies via three interrelated channels, thereby allowing for a sufficient degree of interlink-
ages to model the effect of national and regional shocks on the global economy:  
1) Contemporaneous effects of 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  on 𝑥𝑖𝑡 
2) Dependencies of 𝑥𝑖𝑡 on the lagged values of 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  
3) Contemporaneous cross-country dependencies between the error terms 
In order to analyze the international dynamics and economic relationships, we focus on impulse 
responses which summarize the dynamics of all endogenous variables following a shock to a 
specific variable. There is an unfinished debate on the identification of a structural fiscal shock 
which captures only discretionary fiscal actions (Perotti, 2007). But with regard to cross-border 
externalities, fiscal spillovers stemming from a budget deficit in one country would occur any-
way, i.e. whether the cause is only discretion or a combination of discretion, automatic re-
sponses, and other effects. Therefore, we stick to identifying generalized impulse response 
functions. These impulse responses, though broadly interpretable, are informative and capture 
overall spillover effects (Hebous and Zimmermann, 2013) 
 
3.3 Estimation of Generalised Impulse response functions 
In the following, we make use of the Generalized Impulse Response Function (GIRF), proposed 
by Koop et al. (1996), and developed further in Pesaran and Shin (1998) for vector error-cor-
recting models. GIRFs are used by the large majority of GVAR studies (see, for instance, Dees 
et al., 2007).  
The GIRF is an alternative to the Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function (OIRF) of Sims 
(1980). The OIRF approach requires the impulse responses to be computed with respect to a 
set of orthogonalized shocks, while the GIRF approach considers shocks to individual errors 
and integrates out the effects of the other shocks using the observed distribution of all the shocks 
without any orthogonalization. Unlike the OIRF, the GIRF is invariant to the ordering of the 
variables and the countries in the GVAR model, which is clearly an important consideration. 
Even if a suitable ordering of the variables in a given country model can be arrived at from 
economic theory or general a priori reasoning, it is not clear how to order countries in the ap-
plication of the OIR to the GVAR model (Dees et al., 2007).  
Of course, there are some problems interpreting our results as an assessment of the macroeco-
nomic effects of ‘fiscal shocks’ (Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández, 2015). We recognize 
such a problem, but given the difficulties in identifying structural shocks in a GVAR model 
(sign-restriction or narrative identification schemes are not undisputed), and the number of ex-
clusion restrictions and/or the ordering of the variables and the countries in the specification 
would entail many controversial assumptions.16 Hence, we decided to summarize the dynamic 
of the macroeconomic variables in the system following a domestic or regional shock through 
GIRFs. These functions contain not only information about the effects of discretionary fiscal 
actions, but also information about automatic stabilizers and other effects. Anyway, the GIRFs 
are informative about the overall macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy showing the transmis-
sion of shocks to the local economy and also to other countries in the sample (Ricci-Risquete 
and Ramajo-Hernández, 2015). However, one needs to be cautious when interpreting the effect 
of shocks using GIRFs as they do not exclude the possibility of a correlation of the error terms. 
                                                          
16 Caldara and Kamps (2008, 2012) compare different identification approaches in that respect. 
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Formally, the GIRF represents the impact of a one-standard-error shock at time 𝑡 to the 𝑙𝑡ℎ 
equation of the GVAR representation on the 𝑗𝑡ℎ variable at time 𝑡 + 𝑛. The GIRF is computed 
as follows:  
𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹(𝑥𝑡; 𝑢𝑙𝑡; 𝑛) =
б𝑗
′ 𝐴𝑛𝐺0
−1𝛴𝑢б𝑙
√б𝑗
′𝛴𝑢б𝑙
, 𝑛 = 0,1,2, … ; 𝑙, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑘   (7) 
where б𝑙 is a selection vector with unity as the 𝑙
𝑡ℎ equation in the case of the country-specific 
shock indicating which equation is supposed to be shocked.  
 
3.4 Shock selection 
As we do not use a use a single synthetic indicator of the stance of public finances in our bench-
mark model and model government spending and revenue separately, we are able to analyze 
the effects each fiscal policy in a more comprehensive manner. Although we focus on restrictive 
fiscal policy shocks, it can be expected that the precise effects of a fiscal shock differ depending 
on whether the shock is triggered by a change in spending or on the revenue side. The im-
portance of jointly modeling both public revenue and public expenditure has often been dis-
cussed in the literature and is straightforward (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).17 In our analysis, 
we only analyze restrictive fiscal policy shocks  
Regarding the origin of shocks, we differentiate between national and regional shocks. We are 
shocking a single country’s fiscal policies (Germany, France) and, secondly, investigate so- 
called “regional” fiscal policy shocks in the Euro area. To be more specific, we employ the 
GIRFs in order to analyze the dynamic effects of the following shocks: 
(1) Negative shock “Change in Government Expenditure” in Germany 
(2) Positive shock “Change in Government Revenue” in Germany 
(3) Negative shock “Change in Government Expenditure” in France 
(4) Positive shock “Change in Government Revenue” in France 
(5) Negative shock “Change in Government Expenditure” in the Euro area 
(6) Positive shock “Change in Government Revenue” in the Euro area 
We magnitude of each shock listed above is one standard error.  
We analyze the effects on each individual country as well as the entire regions. The regions 
used are the “Euro area” containing the countries of the EMU, the region called “Rest of Eu-
rope” comprising of European countries which are not part of the EMU. In this regard, the latter 
country group is supposed to represent countries which are part or affiliated with the EU but 
not part of the Euro area. The small region of “North America” contains only Canada and the 
US. 
Since each economy is potentially related to the others, these simulations will determine the 
degree of international spillovers. Regarding the country-individual shocks, the origin of shock 
is temporarily excluded from the region “Euro area”. This allows us to interpret the impulse 
response for the Euro area as the sum of true spillover effects to the members of the EMU. 
Otherwise, if the country was still be part of the region, the spillover effects would be mixed 
up with the effects in the economy where the shock originates. 
                                                          
17 Blanchard and Perotti (2002): “Both government expenditure and taxation affect GDP: since the two are pre-
sumably not independent, to estimate the effects of one, it is also necessary to include the other. Hence, we focus 
on two-variable breakdowns of the budget, consisting of an expenditure and a revenue variable.” 
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A central focus of our analysis is on impulse responses following a Euro area-wide budget 
deficit or surplus (“austerity”, “fiscal compact”). A regional shock of a given variable is not 
focused on a particular economy, but simultaneously occurs in every country of a predefined 
region. As pointed out by Dees et al. (2007), a “regional” shock can be defined as a weighted 
average of a shock to the same variable for all investigated countries, using as weights some 
indicator that reflects their relative importance in the world economy as a whole (in our case, 
GDP in purchasing power parity terms).18 In other words, a “regional” shock can be understood 
as a disturbance with a magnitude similar to that of a domestic shock, to which each country 
contributes a percentage based on the size of its economy (Hebous and Zimmermann, 2013).  
Assessing “regional” shocks is legitimate in countries where public sector balances are charac-
terized by co-movement with other countries (e.g. due to policy compromises reached in Brus-
sels or policy reactions to a global shock) and thus a more integrated and possibly coordinated 
stance with respect to fiscal policies can be observed. Therefore, the “regional shock” is defined 
with respect to the Euro area only, thus excluding the United States and other non-European 
countries (Dragomirescu-Gaina and Philippas, 2015) 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Unit Root Tests 
Although the GVAR methodology can be applied to stationary and/or integrated variables, we 
follow Pesaran et al. (2004) and assume that the variables included in the country-specific mod-
els are integrated of order one (or I(1)). This allows us to distinguish between short-run and 
long-run relations and interpret the long-run (cointegrating) relations (Dees et al., 2007). There-
fore, we begin by examining the integration properties of the individual series under consider-
ation. In view of the widely accepted poor power performance of traditional Dickey–Fuller 
(DF) tests, we report unit root t-statistics based on weighted symmetric estimation of ADF type 
regressions introduced by Park and Fuller (1995). 
 
Table 1. Results of unit root tests 
Levels (Critical value at 5% level: -3.24) 
 Aus Aust Bel Can Den Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire 
rgdp -2.011 -2.121 -1.389 -1.797 -1.604 -1.651 -1.822 -1.428 -1.863 -3.133 
defl -0.556 -2.510 -1.564 -2.399 -1.369 -1.965 -0.599 -1.213 -0.164 -2.076 
Ltir -1.438 -2.463 -2.117 -3.143 -2.595 -1.116 -2.131 -2.928 -1.603 -2.379 
exp  -3.000 -2.438  -1.564 -0.806 -1.822 -2.543 -2.751 -2.636 
rev  -2.124 -2.223  -3.993 -1.495 -2.235 -2.046 -1.925 -1.945 
 Ita Jap Net Nor Por Spa Swe Swi UK US 
rgdp -2.167 -1.401 -3.298 -1.964 -2.235 -1.821 -2.004 -2.591 -1.662 -2.269 
defl -0.879 -0.839 -0.399 -1.673 -1.543 1.044 -2.680 -1.605 -0.164 -0.636 
Ltir -2.009 -0.597 -2.656 -2.913 -2.572 -1.746 -1.926 -2.802 -2.619 -3.623 
exp -1.171  -1.420 -2.550 -1.171 -4.436 -1.409 -1.139 -1.713 -1.085 
rev -1.721  -3.109 -2.353 -3.912 -2.644 -2.507 -1.092 -3.212 -2.882 
First Differences (Critical value at 5% level: -2.55) 
 Aus Aust Bel Can Den Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire 
                                                          
18 See Dees et al. (2007) and Dees et al. (2010) for a detailed derivation of the “global” shock which we apply as 
a “regional” shock in our fiscal spillover GVAR.  
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Δrgdp -3.280 -3.942 -5.186 -4.965 -5.086 -3.357 -3.866 -5.137 -2.308 -3.872 
Δdefl -3.753 -2.709 -4.711 -6.595 -7.060 -4.425 -2.960 -6.432 -1.799 -1.715 
ΔLtir -4.094 -6.679 -5.424 -3.951 -6.840 -3.789 -6.503 -7.175 -5.875 -4.954 
Δexp  -5.195 -9.035  -4.123 -4.275 -4.277 -4.801 -10.54 -4.062 
Δrev  -6.853 -4.606  -6.280 -4.621 -3.680 -10.19 -8.039 -7.704 
 Ita Jap Net Nor Por Spa Swe Swi UK US 
Δrgdp -3.664 -6.128 -4.011 -2.453 -3.669 -2.327 -4.945 -4.650 -4.461 -4.003 
Δdefl -2.013 -3.433 -6.227 -5.118 -2.210 -2.868 -2.825 -2.650 -2.153 -3.724 
Δltir -2.456 -5.330 -6.640 -5.156 -4.397 -2.469 -4.764 -5.364 -6.933 -5.093 
Δexp -3.928  -2.457 -4.553 -8.899 -5.022 -3.879 -4.695 -6.029 -2.604 
Δrev -5.925  -9.348 -7.289 -9.261 -8.218 -2.857 -3.808 -9.266 -5.202 
Notes: For Unit Root Tests using data in levels numbers in bold indicate significance at the 5% level. Regarding 
Unit Root Tests using data in first difference, bold numbers indicate that the H0 is non-rejected at the 5% level. 
The selection of the optimal lag numbers is in each case based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). 
Regarding the order of integration, the GVAR can include variables which are I(0) and I(1). 
However, the inclusion of variables which contain a higher order of integration violates the 
assumption of the GVAR and might lead to severe bias. Our unit root test results presented in 
Table 1 indicate evidence of I(2) variables. With respect to the national real GDP variables 
(rgdp), we find borderline evidence of I(2) variables for Greece, Norway and Spain. The cor-
responding test statistics are not significant at the 5%, but 10% level. Because it is not feasible 
to use first differences of rgdp for the countries mentioned and levels of rgdp for the remaining 
countries, we performed additional tests by performing the Phillips-Perron test which rejects 
the H0 for the three national variables at the 5% level. Keeping in mind that structural disturb-
ances like the sharp decline in real GDP during the financial crisis in 2008 can influence the 
results of unit root tests towards a too high integration order, GDP is used in levels as we assume 
that all national variables are I(1).  
For the GDP deflator (defl), we find even larger evidence of I(2) dynamics for the domestic 
variables of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the UK. We perform additional tests (e.g. Phil-
lips-Perron tests) and obtain similar results. We follow Dees et al. (2005) and use the first dif-
ference of the price variable for every country in our sample. The GDP deflator in first differ-
ences equals its percentage change and therefore the inflation rate (Δdefl).  
For the remaining interest rate variable (ltir) and the fiscal expenditure and revenue (exp, rev), 
we find very small evidence of I(2) variables. Therefore, the variables mentioned are included 
in levels. 
 
4.2 Specification and estimation of the country-specific models 
The specification of each country-specific VARX* and VECMX* model is based on an appro-
priate choice of the lag lengths for the domestic and foreign variables as well as the cointegra-
tion rank. 
Due to data availability, we start the empirical analysis by setting a lag length of two for the 
endogenous variables (𝑝𝑖) and one for the weakly exogenous variables (𝑞𝑖). However, due to 
severe residual autocorrelation for some countries (especially in the European periphery) for 
these lag lengths, we increase the maximum to 4 respectively 2 lags. In Table 2, we present the 
lag length used in the estimation process which is primarily based on the results of residual 
autocorrelation tests.19 When we detected more than one lag combinations which did not indi-
cate residual autocorrelation at the 5% level, the choice was based on the results of the Schwarz-
                                                          
19 The F-version of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic is used. 
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Bayesian information criterion. Overall, the weak evidence of serial correlation in the residual 
for our benchmark specification. 
 
Table 2. Lag lengths of the country-specific models 
  𝑝𝑖 𝑞𝑖  𝑝𝑖 𝑞𝑖 
AUSTRALIA 2 1 ITALY 4 1 
AUSTRIA 2 1 JAPAN 2 1 
BELGIUM 2 1 NETHERLANDS 3 1 
CANADA 3 1 NORWAY 3 1 
DENMARK 3 1 PORTUGAL 2 1 
FINLAND 2 2 SPAIN 2 1 
FRANCE 3 2 SWEDEN 2 1 
GERMANY 2 2 SWITZERLAND 1 1 
GREECE 3 1 UNITED KINGDOM 2 1 
IRELAND 2 1 UNITED STATES 3 1 
Notes: 𝑝𝑖  denotes the number of lags for the endogenous variables in  
the model of country i. 𝑞𝑖 denotes the number of lags for the (assumed)  
weakly exogenous (foreign) variables. 
Regarding the possibility of cointegrating relations, the rank for each country is chosen based 
on Johansen’s trace and maximal eigenvalue statistics as set out in Pesaran et al. (2000). Addi-
tionally, we use the eigenvalues and the persistence profiles (PPs) which refer to the time 
proﬁles of the effects of variable-speciﬁc shocks on the cointegrating relations in the GVAR 
model. Therefore, the PPs are used in order to observe the convergence behavior of the assumed 
number of cointegrating relations in the country model. 
 
Table 3. Cointegration rank of the country-specific models 
 𝑟𝑖  𝑟𝑖 
AUSTRALIA 1 ITALY 2 
AUSTRIA 1 JAPAN 1 
BELGIUM 1 NETHERLANDS 2 
CANADA 1 NORWAY 0 
DENMARK 1 PORTUGAL 2 
FINLAND 2 SPAIN 1 
FRANCE 2 SWEDEN 2 
GERMANY 2 SWITZERLAND 2 
GREECE 2 UNITED KINGDOM 2 
IRELAND 1 UNITED STATES 1 
Note: 𝑟𝑖 denotes the cointegration rank in the model of country i. 
As mentioned in section 3.2, the main assumption of the GVAR is the weak exogeneity of the 
country-specific foreign variables. In order to check this assumption, we followed Dees et al. 
(2005) and tested for weak exogeneity by running axillary regressions and observing average 
pairwise cross-section correlations. The auxiliary regressions examine the joint significance of 
the estimated error corrections terms for the country-specific foreign variables. The appropriate 
lag length is based on the empirical realizations of the Schwarz-Bayes criterion and the results 
of the residual autocorrelation tests.  
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Our results reveal a dominant role of the US economy in our model – especially with regard to 
the development of the interest rate variable. This does not come at a surprise because the US 
PPP-GDP share is about 40% of the sum of all countries in our model. Both tests indicate that 
the assumption of weak exogeneity of the foreign variable might be violated in the US model. 
Therefore, we exclude the foreign “star” variables for the long-term interest rate and the infla-
tion rate from the US model. For real GDP, we find no evidence of a violation of the weak 
exogeneity assumption. For Germany, we find larger evidence that the foreign real GDP varia-
ble is not weakly exogenous. Although Germany’s weight is significantly smaller than that of 
the US, it might be more important for the economic development of the countries in our sample 
because we focus almost entirely on European countries. Therefore, we exclude the foreign real 
GDP variable from the German model.20  
As our analysis focuses on the interpretation of the GIRFs, we feel confident that our model is 
overall well specified. For the estimation of the GIRFs, we simulated the model by using boot-
strap procedures. We use 2500 draws to obtain median estimates as well as the confidence 
intervals. Because of a large number of endogenous variables and data limitations due to our 
relatively small sample, we performed shrinkage on the correlation matrix for point and boot-
strap estimates as well as data generation.  
The GIRFs presented in the Figures 1 to 6 primarily reflects the effects on domestic rgdp. We 
present GIRFs for the effects on regional inflation and for the inflation dynamics for the country 
where the shock originated. Impulses are presented over a time horizon of 28 quarters. The 
horizontal axis shows the time horizon, whereas the vertical axis measures the response of each 
variable (in percentage change) for each country 
 
4.3 Global VAR estimations  
4.3.1. Shock to German government total expenditure 
The GIRFs for a one percentage point negative shock to German government total expenditure 
are presented in Figure 1.21 The negative German government total expenditure shock is ac-
companied by a significant decline in German real GDP of around 0.81% after four quarters 
and by 1.02% after 8 quarters (see Figure 1). 
The transmission of the shock to the regional and country-specific real GDP takes place rather 
quickly and the effects of the shock are, in a textbook fashion, generally statistically significant 
in the short-run. The shape of the impulse responses resembles those in comparable GVAR 
studies as those of Dees et al. (2007) and of Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández (2015). The 
impulse responses stabiles after 8-12 depending in most cases indicating that our model is sta-
ble. For most countries, the effect becomes insignificant after four to six quarters. Therefore, 
we mainly focus our analysis on the effect after four quarters and therefore on the short-run 
effects of the German shock.22 
Regarding fiscal spillovers to specific countries to the individual Euro area countries, we find 
the strongest effects for Finland (-0.98%), Ireland (-0.81%) and the Netherlands (-0.58%). Fur-
thermore, we estimate relatively moderate effects on Italy and Austria (both: -0.51%). Weaker 
effects are found for France (-0.41%), Spain (-0.43%) and Portugal (-0.45%). Somehow as ex-
pected, the effect on Greek real GDP is not significant at all and of very low magnitude (-
0.30%). Surprisingly, the effect on Belgian GDP (-0.35%) is also relatively low and barely 
                                                          
20 Detailed results of our tests of weak exogeneity are available on request. 
21 The shock has been rescaled to match a decrease of one percentage point. 
22 The following values in brackets in this section represent the accumulated effect on real GDP after 
four quarters if not stated otherwise. 
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significant after four quarters. The GDP-weighted effect on the Euro area (not including Ger-
many) is about -0.48%. 
Regarding the effects on European countries which are not part of the Euro area, we observe, 
somehow surprisingly, the strongest effects for Sweden (-0.77%) followed by the effect on 
Danish real GDP (-0.59%). Weaker effects are found for the United Kingdom (-0.39%) and the 
Switzerland (-0.30%). The weakest effect is found for Norway (-0.25%). The overall GDP-
weighted impact on the region “Rest of Europe” (-0.42%) can be compared with the effect on 
the Euro area in terms of magnitude and significance.  
Overall, we do not find evidence in favor of the expansionary fiscal contraction hypothesis 
(Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990, De Castro (2006, and Kameda, 2012). Regarding the comparisons 
between effects on EMU countries and other European countries, we find some evidence that 
spillovers in the monetary union are stronger. These evidence arise primarily from a comparison 
of the individual country shocks. Apart from a surprisingly strong effect on Swedish GDP, the 
spillover effects on non-EMU countries are relatively low compared to member states of the 
EMU. For example, according to trade and financial relationships, we would have expected that 
spillovers from a German fiscal shock to be more important for the Switzerland than Italy or 
Finland. This aspect is partly, although to a much lesser extent) reflected by the larger effect on 
the region “Euro area” compared to the effect on “Rest of Europe”. This may mirror the (am-
plifying) effect of a common monetary policy in the Euro area. However, we find a large 
amount of heterogeneity regarding spillover effects within the Euro area. In our opinion, this 
heterogeneity can be explained by trade relationships to a larg(er) extent. Seen on the whole, 
thus, the trade channel seems to play an important role in the transmission of a German fiscal 
shock. It seems to even dominate the competitiveness and the financial channel, as can be seen 
from the impulse responses for inflation and interest rates. 
Our empirical results are somehow comparable to those gained by Georgiadis and Hollmayr 
(2016) based on a Mixed-Cross-Section Global VAR (MCS GVAR) and a smaller sample pe-
riod than ours (1999Q1-2009Q4). We have chosen to present two maps, one of them showing 
the results of Georgiadis and Hollmayr (2016) and the other one presents our own results. Both 
graphs in Figure 7 show the magnitude of spillovers of a fiscal shock in Germany (defined as 
the absolute mean estimates GIRFS after two respectively four quarters) to other European 
countries.23  
In general, we find higher spillovers compared with the results of Georgiadis/Hollmayr (2016). 
In their study, the authors only find “moderate” spillover for the UK and partly for France and 
Italy. Putting our results into perspective, the most drastic differences can be found for Finland, 
Sweden and Ireland. While we find (very) large effects on these countries, Georgiadis/Hollmayr 
(2016) on the other hand find very low spillover. Furthermore, out results indicate rather low 
spillovers to the UK.  
Regarding the effects on Inflation, we observe a decrease in the Euro area and in the “Rest of 
Europe” although the magnitude of the reaction remains limited and non-significant (as is well 
known from other GVAR studies such as Dees et al., 2007 and other empirical approaches to 
fiscal spillovers such as Weyerstrass et al., 2006). For interest rates, we observe no significant 
effect on Euro area long-term Interest rates, while we find negative impacts on interest rates in 
North America and Rest of Europe which are significant but very low in magnitude (between 
1-3 basis points of quarterly interest rates (4-12 basis points of annual interest rates)24. 
                                                          
23 We select the fourth quarter because, as a stylised fact, fiscal shocks are (fully) transmitted with a certain time 
lag over time. This can be seen clearly in Figure 1. 
24 As we closely follow the approach of Dees et al. (2007) regarding the transformation of interest rate variables, 
the long-term interest rate responses have a quarterly dimension. A response of -0.0004 equals a reduction of four 
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4.3.2 Shock to French government total expenditure 
Figure 2 presents the GIRFs of a negative one percentage point shock to French government 
total expenditure. It results in a decrease of 0.68 percentage points decrease in French real GDP 
after four quarters 
The pattern of the results turns out to be rather similar to the German fiscal shock. Again, for 
the majority of countries, the shock is significant on impact and remains significant until around 
6 quarters. However, the magnitudes clearly differ from those for the German fiscal shock as 
they are smaller in general. We again focus on the accumulated effects after 4 quarters and 
primarily on the relative size of effects between countries and regions. 
Regarding the effects on the Euro area, the strongest effects are observed for Germany (-
0.47%), Ireland (-0.46%) and the Netherlands (-0.38%). Relatively mediocre effects are found 
for Austria (-0.29%), Italy (-0.27%), Portugal (-0.29%) and Spain (-0.30%). Weaker effects are 
found for Finland (-0.22%) and surprisingly Belgium (-0.23%). Again, we find the weakest 
spillover for Greek real GDP (-0.21%) after four quarters which is already insignificant after 4 
quarters. The effect on the real GDP in the Euro area (not including France) measuring the 
GDP-weighted spillover to the Euro area is about 0.35%. 
Similar to the results of the German shock, we find the strongest effects for Sweden (-0.43%) 
and Denmark (-0.36%) regarding the remaining European countries. Medium effects are found 
for Switzerland (-0.29%) and the UK (-0.23%). Weakest effects are again found for Norway (-
0.17%). Overall, the GDP-weighted spillover to region “Rest of Europe” is 0.26%. 
Overall, we find again stronger effects within the EMU compared to the “Rest of Europe”. 
Concerning fiscal spillovers to specific countries, the effects on Southern EMU member coun-
tries such as Spain and Portugal relatively more pronounced than in the case of a German fiscal 
shock. Again real output in the Euro area is negatively affected by the adverse fiscal shock in 
France. The same is valid for the country group called “Rest of Europe”, although to a lesser 
extent. This again our results indicate evidence of the (amplifying) effect of a common mone-
tary policy in the Euro area. Comparing the French and the German shock, we overall find 
stronger spillover effects for the German shock on GDP of European Countries. 
Regarding the impact on inflation and interest rates, French inflation decreased significant on 
impact while Euro area inflation is negatively but not significantly affected. We observe signif-
icant effects on the inflation rate in “Rest of Europe”. However, the magnitudes are very low. 
The impact on interest rates is negative but not significant for the Euro area und North America 
but we find evidence of a small significant decrease of interest rates in “Rest of Europe”. 
 
4.3.3 Shock to German total public revenue 
The GIRFs results of a positive percentage point shock to German total public revenue are 
displayed in Figure 3. The mean estimates go into the expected direction. However, the results 
do in most cases not turn out to be significant, as can be seen at the rather wide confidence 
bands. One exception in this respect is Switzerland with its strong trade ties to Germany.  
The lack of significance in the estimates may be due to the relatively small size of the available 
overall sample which forces us to restrict the dynamic specification of the model (Ricci-
Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández, 2015). 25 Taking this as a starting point, Ricci-Risquete and 
                                                          
basis points of the quarterly yield. In order to obtain annual yield effects, the responses have to be multiplied by 
4. 
25 This phenomenon is well-known in the general GVAR literature (see Dees et al., 2007) and particularly from 
the fiscal spillover GVAR literature (Dragomirescu-Gaina and Philippas, 2015, and Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-
Hernández, 2015). 
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Ramajo-Hernández (2015), Georgidas and Hollmayr, 2016, Hebous and Zimmermann (2013) 
and Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2013) even leave out the confidence intervals from their visual 
presentation of the impulse responses (GIRFs). In any case, this fact does not detract from an 
economic interest of our application (as in Galesi and Sgherri 2009). Therefore, we continue 
with interpreting the mean estimates with a special focus on the effects after 6 periods. How-
ever, our results have to be interpreted with caution due to the issues regarding the significance 
discussed above. 
We choose to compare the effects after 4 periods in order to remain a certain degree of compa-
rability with respect our previous estimates. However, by choosing to analyze the effects after 
4 periods, we risk to neglect some of the effects as shocks to fiscal revenue (e.g. by changing 
taxes) can be expected to affect the economy not as fast as a change in spending. Whereas an 
expenditure shock feeds through directly through the economy, the fiscal revenue shock affects 
the economy, as a first step, indirectly through changes in available income. This aspect is sup-
ported by our results as the impulses take longer to stabilize. Therefore, we also include the 
effect after 8 periods in our analysis. However, relative strength of spillovers across countries 
is generally invariant as the relative effects after four, six and eight quarters are very similar. 
Comparing our results with the German fiscal spending shock, we find a similar ranking in 
terms of spillover for the countries of the Euro area magnitudes indicating that our results are 
results are overall robust with respect to the source of the fiscal shock. The strongest effects are 
again found for Finland (Q4:0.59%, Q8:0.889%), Ireland (Q4:0.349%, Q8:0.698%) and the 
Netherlands (Q4:0.318%, Q8:0.628%). Medium-size effects are found for Austria (Q4:0.252%, 
Q8:0.449%), Spain (Q4:0.274%, Q8:0.511%), France (Q4:0.245%, Q8:0.433%), Italy 
(Q4:0.239%, Q8:0.376%) and Portugal (Q4:0.230%, Q8: 0.467%). Again, the weakest effects 
are found for Greece (Q4:0.102%, Q8:0.344%) and Belgium (Q4:0.105%, Q8:0.248%). The 
GDP-weighted spillover on the Euro area (not including Germany) is around 0.252% after four 
quarter and 0.450% after eight quarters. 
With regard to the remaining European countries, we observe some changes in the ranking of 
spillover magnitudes. The largest effect of a positive shock to German fiscal revenue is on the 
Swiss real GDP (Q4:0.473%, Q8:0.794%). This is a striking contrast to the previous results for 
the shock on fiscal spending in Germany. However, in accordance with the previous results, the 
effects on the Scandinavian countries of Sweden (Q4:0.401%, Q8:0.630%)) and Denmark 
(Q4:0.303%, Q8:0.494%) are again high. The effect on the UK is rather limited (Q4:0.167%, 
Q8:0.324%) and the weakest impact is observed for the Norwegian real GDP (Q4:0.167%, 
Q4:0.249%). The GDP-weighted spillover to the region “Rest of Europe” is about 0.234% 
(0.415%) after 4 periods (8 periods). 
Overall, we observe similar results compared with the previous shock to German fiscal spend-
ing. The biggest difference is apparent for Switzerland. Furthermore, the Swiss response is the 
only one which is significant after four and even eight periods. As theoretically expected, a 
revenue shock appears to take longer to affect the domestic and foreign economies. However, 
the overall effect of both shocks are similar in magnitude in the medium-run. The impacts on 
inflation rates and interest rates are negative as expected but not significant and very low in 
magnitude. 
 
 
4.3.4 Shock to French total public revenue 
Consider now the GIRFs for a one percentage point negative shock to French total public rev-
enue which are displayed in Figure 4.  
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Again, the revenue shock needs more time to become effective than the fiscal expenditure 
shock, as expected from theory. However, the expected negative effect materializes for all coun-
tries and regions and appears to stabilize much faster compared with our results in 4.3.3. The 
effects are significant throughout – which should be emphasized with an eye on our brief dis-
cussion in section 4.3.3 about the meaning of insignificance in the fiscal spillover GVAR con-
text.26 
Regarding the effects on the Euro area, the strongest effects are observed for Ireland (Q4:0.38%, 
Q8:0.57%), and Finland (Q4:0.34%, Q8:0.45%) followed by Italy (Q4:0.30%, Q8:0.41%), Ger-
many (Q4:0.27%, Q8:0.42%) and the Netherlands (Q4:0.25%, Q8:0.43%). Weaker effects are 
found for Greece (Q4:0.23%, Q4:0.43%) Portugal (Q4:0.20%, Q8:0.34%), Spain (Q4:0.19%, 
Q8:0.39%), Belgium (Q4:0.19%, Q8:0.27%) and Austria (Q4:0.18%, Q8:0.28%), the effect on 
the real GDP in the Euro area (not including France) measuring the GDP-weighted spillover to 
the Euro area is about 0.2% (Q8:0.26%). 
We find the strongest effects for Sweden (Q4:0.42%, Q8:0.43%) and Denmark (Q4:0.21%, 
Q8:0.34%)) regarding the remaining European countries. Medium effects are found for Swit-
zerland (Q4:0.16%, Q8:0.31%) and the UK (Q4:0.16%, Q8:0.26%). Weakest effects are again 
found for Norway (Q4:0.12%, Q8:0.20 %). Overall, the GDP-weighted spillover to region 
“Rest of Europe” is 0.14% (Q8:0.19%). 
Comparing the results with our findings for a French spending shock, the find a similar ranking 
with only a small number of changes regarding relative magnitudes of spillover. For Euro area 
countries, we again find the strongest effects for Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany. For the 
latter, the effects are a little smaller compared to the spending shock. For Italy and Greece, the 
spillover effects of a revenue shock are larger. For the remaining countries, we observe a similar 
pattern. Regarding the effects on non-EMU countries in Europe, the effects are very similar 
across countries. 
Similar to the French spending shock, we overall find stronger effects on EMU countries. The 
effects of the spending shock appear to be stronger even when we take into account that revenue 
shocks might take longer to fully generate their effects on the economies. Regarding EMU 
countries, we observe some marginal changes. In comparison to the German revenue shock, the 
North-South divide is less strongly visible.  
 
4.3.5 “Regional” shock to total public expenditure 
The GIRFs for a “regional” shock to total public expenditure are presented in Figure 5. There-
fore, fiscal expenditure in all countries in the EMU are simultaneously shocked based on the 
country’s GDP share of total regional GDP. Therefore, it is not possible to observe spillovers 
directly but we obtain an impression of the effects of a coordinated shock to Euro area fiscal 
expenditure. 
Our results indicate by far the strongest effects in terms of the magnitudes of fiscal spillovers 
(this may, however, partly be traced back to our definition of the “regional” standard deviation 
with a 27 percent share of Germany). What is more, the significance is higher than in the cases 
of Figures 1 to 4 and in many cases spreads all over the sample period. Apart from that, the 
effects of “regional shocks” reveal a remarkable degree of similarity in the cyclical pattern of 
the fiscal spillovers of the European economies.  
                                                          
26 The fact that fiscal spillovers of a German public receipts shock are insignificant as opposed to a French shock 
of the French realisation of the same variable may hint at some specifities such as a high volatility of the German 
fiscal total receipts time series. 
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Finally, the effects of the negative “regional” fiscal shock on real GDP are negative in all con-
sidered economies during the period. They are negative in all major economies on impact, but 
they differ in magnitude and, partly, also significance the following quarters. Again, we do not 
find evidence in favor of the expansionary fiscal contraction hypothesis. 
Regarding an evaluation of the effects, we again focus on the effect after 4 quarters. The largest 
effects are visible for Finland (-1.182%), Ireland (-1.04%) and Germany (-0.961%). Strong ef-
fects are also observable for Italy (-0.759%), the Netherlands (0.734%). Weaker effects are 
found for Austria (-0.585%), Portugal (-0.562%) and Spain (-0.541). The lowest effects are 
again found for Greece (-0.386%) and Belgium (-0.528%). Overall, we obtain a GDP-weighted 
impact on Euro area GDP of -0.753%. 
For non-EMU countries, Sweden is most strongly affected (-0.911%) followed by Denmark (-
0.692%). Like before, the effects on the UK (-0.482%) and especially Norway (-0.355%) are 
relatively weak. The overall effect on the region “Rest of Europe is -0.5352. 
Interpreting our results, it is not surprising that the overall effects on EMU countries are higher 
compared to non-EMU countries as the shocks originate in the EMU. However, the effects on 
non-EMU countries are relatively high. Therefore, we interpret our results as evidence of a 
strong dependency of European countries outside the EMU on developments within the Euro 
area.  
In the case of the “regional” government expenditure shock, the results are very similar, in 
terms of the sign and the significance, to those of a shock to German government expenditure 
discussed above (significance even higher). This result confirms the predominant role of the 
German economy in the public expenditure developments across countries. 
Inflation in the Euro area falls slightly but significantly as an immediate reaction to the “re-
gional” Euro area fiscal shock. Fiscal spillovers to inflation are thus “deeper in the short run 
than in the long run” (Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández, 2015). This stands in contrast to 
the fiscal spillovers to the “Rest of Europe” whose inflation is not affected by the “regional” 
fiscal shock. Seen on the whole, thus, the relatively weak reaction of inflation to fiscal spillovers 
is comparable to evidence gained on approaches different from GVAR such as Weyerstrass et 
al. (2006). These findings are in line with the results recently obtained by Dragomirescu-Gaina 
and Philippas (2015), Hebous and Zimmermann (2013) and Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Her-
nández (2014). These authors argue that fiscal area-wide shocks have larger economic conse-
quences than fiscal domestic shocks in order to motivate the need for better policy coordination. 
The effect on interest rates is larger and with respect to the “Rest of Europe” and “North Amer-
ica significant. For “North America”, the annual interest rate reduction is about 6 basis points 
after 4 quarter (up to 12 basis points for “Rest of Europe”). For the Euro area, the effect is not 
significant but up to 12 basis points after 4 lags. 
 
4.3.6 “Regional” shock to total public revenue 
Let us finally turn to the GIRFs for a positive “regional” shock to total public revenue (Figure 
6). Here, we have to deal with the same problem as in the case of the German fiscal shock to 
total public revenue (which does not come as a surprise given the 27 percent country-weight of 
Germany in terms of PPP-GDP). The sign of the fiscal spillovers turns out to be negative over-
all, as theoretically expected. However, there is a lack of significance throughout. One excep-
tion is again Switzerland. As before, we focus on the median estimates. Again, the results have 
to be interpreted with caution. 
The biggest effects are again on Finland (Q4:0.454, Q8: 0.793), Germany (Q4:0.372, Q8: 0.605) 
Ireland (Q4: 0.302, Q8: 0.596) and the Netherlands (Q4:0.267, Q8:0.500). Medium-size effects 
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are found for Austria (Q4:0.213, Q8:0.373), France (Q4:0.214, Q8:0.373), Portugal (Q4:0.201, 
Q8: 0.408) and Spain 0.178, 0.463. The weakest effects are obtained for Italy (Q4: 0.129, Q8: 
0.330), Beldium (Q4:0.077, Q8:0.213) and, again, Greece (Q4:0.07, Q8: 0.280). The overall 
effect on the Euro area is 0.238 (Q8: 0.452). 
For Switzerland, we find a very strong effect after four and 8 quarters (0.445 respectively 
0.729). For Sweden (Q4:0.343, Q8: 0.557) and Denmark (Q4: 0.261, Q8: 0.446) the effects are 
high as well. Like before, for the UK (Q4: 0.144, Q8:0.289 and especially for Norway (Q4: 
0.126, Q8:0.230) the effects are pretty weak. As expected, the effects on the region “Rest of 
Europe” (Q4:0.206, Q8:0.373) are smaller than on the EMU. 
  
4.4 Impulse response analysis: conclusions regarding fiscal spillovers to real GDP 
To summarize, the time development of the overall spillovers in the EMU follows a similar 
pattern and the absolute values of spillovers, generally clearly below 1 percent of real GDP, 
may remain at levels that might seem to be under the threshold of policymakers’ attention. In 
this regard, we corroborate the conclusions by Gros and Hobza (2001). 
The results indicate that a fiscal expansion in one country can have a consequence on cross-
border externalities whose size may at times even exceed the domestic change in GDP (as is 
the case, for instance, in section 4.3.1 for the fiscal spillovers to Finland, Ireland, vis-à-vis the 
domestic effect of a cut in German public expenditure). However, since the domestic fiscal 
policy multiplier is already rather high (due to the zero interest rate policies), the absolute size 
of spillovers cannot not grow further considerably (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2015, and 
Gros and Hobza, 2001). 
In general, the results of our GVAR analysis confirm the theoretically-based hypothesis that 
the absolute size of short-run cross-border externalities is in the cases of most of the financially 
distressed countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal rather low. The two basic transmission 
channels working through trade and capital markets (note, that long-term interest rates are con-
tained in all our GVAR specifications) maybe cancel each other out to a large extent. Spillovers 
of such a magnitude hardly pose any important threat to European economies and it is disputa-
ble whether they would call for a more extensive cooperation framework. In that respect, we 
closely follow the conclusions by Gros and Hobza (2001) reached about 15 years ago based on 
a much older macroeconomic data set.  
The relative size of spillovers is considerably higher given the rather small impact of the fiscal 
policies on domestic economies themselves. This indicates that a relatively large part of the 
shock passes through into the rest of Euro area. If under any circumstance, the domestic impact 
of fiscal policies increased, the size of the shocks could increase correspondingly.  
The results indicate that the size and the time profile of fiscal spillover effects are strongly 
dependent on the form that the fiscal expansion takes. As demonstrated above, the cross-border 
externalities turned slightly larger and a bit more delayed when fiscal expansion through a re-
duction in government expenditure was considered (contrary to what was assumed by Gros and 
Hobza, 2001). 
Another research question was whether EMU is increasing the magnitude of the fiscal spillo-
vers. As stated above, various studies on international economic cooperation indicate a very 
important role of the exchange rate regime for the size and sign of potential spillovers. In the 
discussion regarding the need for policy coordination under EMU, it is usually assumed that 
the introduction of the Euro has increased the size of the spillovers, at least as compared to the 
EMS regime (Gros and Hobza, 2001, and Roeger and In’t Veld, 1997). Our results indicate that 
spillovers of fiscal shocks originating in EMU countries are much larger for EMU destinations 
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than for destinations located in the “Rest of the EU”. However, we cannot answer the question 
whether it is a results of the common currency or simply because of higher economic ties (e.g. 
trade relationships).27 
Regarding the interpretation of the GIRFs of the long-term interest rates to the German and 
French shocks, we would expect that a reduction of fiscal spending or an increase in taxation 
decreases interest rates due to a reaction of real GDP as indicated by the GIRFs. Additionally, 
a restrictive fiscal policy shock might decrease the government bond yield via the risk premia 
if the general perception of debt sustainability improves. However, we believe that the rele-
vance of the second argument is limited to France and especially for Germany. 
The results are overall roughly similar across the country-specific shocks. In most cases, the 
effects are very lower for each of our (aggregated) regions. In most cases, the effect on annual 
interest rates is far below 10 basis points. Regarding the significance, the effects on “North 
America” and “Rest of Europe” are more often significant. Concerning the Euro area fiscal 
expenditure shock, we find a strong(er) negative effect on the Euro Area interest rate which is 
highly uncertain as indicated by large confidence bands. For the Rest of Europe and North 
America, we find a significant reduction of annual yields up to 12 basis points. Regarding the 
Euro area fiscal revenue shock, we find no significant effects on the interest rates.  
Comparing our results with theory, our results for the Euro area (weighted) interest rate appears 
puzzling as we would have expected a stronger and more significant decrease in yields due to 
strong responses of real GDP in a majority of countries. We would like to tentatively argue that 
these results may be connected to the sovereign debt crisis and observable co-movements of 
variables. Especially between 2009 and 2012, we have observed that a decrease in real GDP 
was (timely) connected with an actually increased in sovereign yield for the so-called GIIPS-
states. These dynamics might be responsible for the very high estimate uncertainty and the 
lower than expected interest rate responses. The inclusion of an additional variable measuring 
sovereign risk might help to account for these effects. Due to data limitations regarding the size 
of T and the different research focus of this paper, we did not include such a variable in this 
model. 
4.5 Robustness checks 
An important fact that one needs to keep in mind is the strong influence of assumptions under 
which the GVAR analysis is run on the empirical results. These concern comprise the way in 
which the fiscal expansion is executed and financed, the economic importance of the country/ies 
undertaking the expansion, the strategy followed by the monetary authorities, etc. A change in 
one of the assumptions can generate significantly different results. Therefore, in order to assess 
the robustness of the findings described above, alternative scenarios should be considered tak-
ing into account the impact of different conditions under which the fiscal expansion is executed 
on the size of cross-border externalities (Gros and Hobza, 2001). 
In most of the simulations used in Gros and Hobza (2001) but also in other studies it is assumed 
that the fiscal contraction comes through a decrease in government spending.  
But this is not the only way such a contraction can be undertaken. An obvious alternative is an 
increase in government revenue, an alternative we fully take into account in our study. And 
indeed, under the current strict surveillance of the Growth and Stability Pact (SGP) over the 
budgetary policies of the Euro area member countries, it seems that an increase in taxes is, for 
political economy reasons, a much more plausible scenario of fiscal contraction than cutting 
government expenditure as could be seen in the EMU programme countries (Alcidi et al., 2016). 
                                                          
27 Of course, higher economic ties might also be the results of the common currency. 
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Thus, we also have considered in our above estimations how robust are the conclusions con-
cerning spillover effects taking into account different origins of the fiscal contraction.  
We also test for structural breaks in the spirit of Dees et al., 2007). Unfortunately, despite a 
great deal of recent research in this area of GVARs, there is little known about how best to 
model breaks. However, the fact that country-specific models within the GVAR framework are 
specified conditional on foreign variables should help in alleviating the structural problem 
somewhat. And also the structure of the GVAR suggests that the VARX* models that underlie 
the GVAR might be more robust to the possibility of structural breaks as compared to reduced-
form single-equation models (Dees et al. 2007).  
The results of our structural break tests are displayed in Table 4.28 Overall, not surprisingly 
there is evidence of structural instability of an extent usually found in estimated GVARs, but 
this seems to be mainly confined to error variances and does not seem to adversely affect the 
coefficient estimates (Dees et al., 2007). We apply several tests and there are not more than six 
potential structural breaks indicated for around 90 equations we estimate. Moreover, the tests 
do not even convey an unambiguous picture in cases where some indication of a break is indi-
cated. With this good result, our study ranges at the lower bound of GVAR estimations available 
in the literature.29 
Anyway, we deal with the problem of possibly changing error variances by using robust stand-
ard errors when investigating the impact effects of the foreign variables, and base our analysis 
of impulse responses on the bootstrap means and confidence bounds rather than the point esti-
mates to be on the safe side (Dees et al., 2007). Seen on the whole, thus, we feel legitimized to 
interpret our estimated GVAR model as structurally stable and a suitable workhorse to estimate 
fiscal spillovers. 
 
Table 4. Number of rejections of the null of parameter constancy per variable across the 
country-specific models (5 percent level) 
Tests Domestic variables 
 RGDP ΔDefl LTIR Exp Rev  
𝑃𝐾𝑠𝑢𝑏 3 2 1 1 0 7 (7.5%) 
𝑃𝐾𝑚𝑠𝑞 4 1 0 1 0 6 (6.4%) 
robust-Nyblom 2 2 1 1 1 6 (6.4%) 
robust-QLR 2 2 0 1 1 6 (6.4%) 
robust-MW 3 3 0 0 2 8 (8.6%) 
robust-APW 2 2 0 1 0 5 (5.3%) 
Notes: The test statistics PKsup and PKmsq are based on the cumulative sums of OLS residuals, N is the Nyblom 
test for time-varying parameters and QLR, MW and APW are the sequential Wald statistics for a single break at 
an unknown change point. The prefix robust denotes the heteroscedasticity robust version of the tests. All tests are 
implemented at the 5% significance level. 
Our tests for structural breaks also make much sense because structural breaks would make it 
necessary to change and to differentiate between the underlying sub-periods of analysis. Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko (2015) and others agree that spillover effects are limited in normal 
times but can be sizable during recessions, which is related to the zero lower bound (ZLB) 
consideration (Georgiadis and Hollmayr, 2016, Bankowski, 2016).  
                                                          
28 The table is compiled in a way comparable with Table 6 in Dees et al. (2005). 
29 Dees et al. (2005), for instance, come up with stronger evidence of structural breaks than us (quite naturally 
because they use a longer estimation period) and still feel highly legitimised to use their estimated GVAR as their 
workhorse. 
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As indicated in section 3.1, we also employed the cyclically adjusted government primary bal-
ance, as percentage of potential GDP as the fiscal variable to be shocked. Although this variable 
set does not allow for separate expenditure and revenue shocks, the reduction in variables gen-
erates an increase in the degrees of freedom. Regarding the results, we find similar responses 
of real GDP to a German and Euro area shock. Although the inflation responses are slightly 
stronger, we find almost identical interest rate responses indicating that the weak interest rate 
responses are also present when a different fiscal variable is used. However, these results have 
to be interpreted with caution as autocorrelation in the fiscal equations is present across coun-
tries. This does not come as a surprise due to the interpolation of the data. 
5 Conclusions and outlook 
We start our GVAR analysis from the insight that the existence of large externalities from 
decentralized policy actions provides a rationale for centralizing or at least co-ordinate the de-
cision-making of a certain policy area (Alcidi et al., 2016). A necessary but not sufficient con-
dition for the latter is a thorough quantification of the fiscal spillovers in Europe. One valuable 
application of the results gained by our paper would be to link it to the policy debate about the 
recommendation for Germany to conduct an expansionary fiscal policy to provide relief to other 
countries in recession, such as Italy.30  
To contribute to this debate, we identified and measured fiscal spillovers in the EU countries 
empirically, using a regional vector autoregression (GVAR) methodology. For our purposes, 
the individual EU countries, as well as the most important international trading partners, were 
modeled with a special focus on the effects of either single-country or coordinated fiscal shocks 
such as increases in fiscal spending. Our aim was to look at the sign and the absolute values of 
fiscal spillovers in a country-wise perspective and at the time profile (impulse response) of the 
impacts of fiscal shocks. For this purpose, we differentiated between the spillovers of fiscal 
shocks in specific EMU countries and the spillovers of “regional” shocks, i.e. area-wide shocks 
to fiscal policy. Fiscal policy is measured by government expenditure, government revenues or 
the government budget balance, all as percentages of GDP. Special attention was paid to the 
question of whether or not spillovers are stronger within the EMU group than within the larger 
“Rest of Europe” group due to tighter financial or trade links.  
Seen on the whole, we find moderate spillover effects of fiscal policy shocks originating in 
Germany or France. However, there is significant variation regarding magnitude of the spillo-
vers among destination countries and country clusters. Spillovers of a German fiscal expendi-
ture shock are strongest on Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands (about 0.6-0.8) and Sweden, fol-
lowed by Austria and Italy (about 0.5). Notably, the effects on France are of medium size (0.4). 
Regarding the overall pattern of the results, we thus corroborate the empirical results presented 
by Georgiadis and Hollmayr (2016), among others. 
What is more, the effects of fiscal spillovers originating in Germany or France are higher for 
euro area member countries than for non-member countries. Spillovers to the South of the Euro 
area are higher if the fiscal shock originates in France than we deal with a German fiscal shock. 
Effects from France to the South of the Euro area stronger than those originating in Germany. 
Finally, our empirical results reveal a notable asymmetry between France and Germany. In the 
case of a French fiscal spending shock the highest spillovers are those to Germany, Ireland and 
the Netherlands. However, as stated above, the spillovers of a German fiscal expenditure shock 
on French GDP, in turn, are of average size, albeit significant.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, papers using GVAR for studying 
coordinated fiscal policies are still scarce. Secondly, unlike other GVAR models with fiscal 
                                                          
30 See https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/strategic-notes/towards-positive-euro-area-fiscal-stance_en. 
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variables, we consider not a synthetic indicator of the situation of public finances, as the budget 
balance, but total government revenue and total government expenditure separately. Thirdly, 
we model not only the Euro area economies but the countries of the so-called “Rest of Europe” 
and some non-European countries such as the United States. Hence, we are - in contrast to the 
prevailing fiscal spillover literature - able to differentiate between fiscal spillovers to European 
countries within the EMU and to the “Rest of Europe”. Fourthly, we present results of the sim-
ulations concerning the effects of shocks to total government revenue and total government 
expenditure in both the country of origin of the shock and its trading partners in the context of 
the GVAR methodology (as conducted before only by Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández, 
2015, in a different country and region setting). 
Our work can, of course, be extended in a number of directions. Our fiscal shock identification 
strategy may need more fine-tuning. Moreover, our findings are based on a non-structural 
model. Future research could focus on the structural identification of shocks within a global 
model of the world economy to gain a deeper economic understanding of fiscal linkages (Cap-
orale and Girardi, 2011). We may also incorporate non-linearities and attach even more im-
portance to the idiosyncrasies of the crisis-period itself (zero lower bound of the policy rate, 
explicit modeling of the central banks). In addition, we could try to incorporate more endoge-
nous country variables in the GVAR. However, these endeavors were limited in the context of 
this paper by our efforts to guarantee a sufficient number of degrees of freedom. Finally, one 
could experiment with financial instead of trade weights in the link matrix. 
Another interesting avenue would be to model the institutional conditions of the fiscal spillover 
effects explicitly (Georgiadis and Hollmayr, 2016). However, the GVAR structure employed 
in this paper would not be adequate to tackle this issue properly. Instead, one may think of using 
a Mixed-Cross-Section Global VAR (MCS-GVAR) for this purpose. Finally, one could think 
of modeling the ECB as a separate entity which would be a superior way to incorporate the euro 
area-wide interest rate. 
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Figure 1. Generalized impulse responses of a negative one percentage point shock to German 
government total expenditure (bootstrap mean estimates with 80% bootstrap error bounds) 
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Figure 2. Generalized impulse responses of a negative one percentage point shock to French 
fiscal expenditure (bootstrap mean estimates with 80% bootstrap error bounds)  
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Figure 3. Generalized impulse responses of a positive one percentage point shock to German 
total public revenue (bootstrap mean estimates with 80% bootstrap error bounds) 
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Figure 4. Generalized impulse responses of a positive one percentage point shock to French 
total public revenue (bootstrap mean estimates with 80% bootstrap error bounds) 
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Figure 5. Generalized impulse responses of a negative unit (1 s.e.) “regional” shock to gov-
ernment total expenditure (bootstrap mean estimates with 80% bootstrap error bounds) 
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Figure 6. Generalized impulse responses of a positive unit (1 s.e.) “regional” shock to total 
public revenue (bootstrap mean estimates with 80% bootstrap error bounds) 
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Figure 7. Spillover reactions after a German government spending shock (Comparison with 
Georgiadis/Hollmayer (2016)) 
7(a): Results of Geogiadis/Hollmayer 
(2016) 
7(b): Our results 
  
Source: Georgiadis and Hollmayr (2016), Slide 9 Source: Own calculations. Results after 4 Quarters. 
Notes: Spillover effects, Green>0.70, Bright green<0.70, 
Yellow<0.55, Orange<0.4, Red <0.35. Units are percent 
change in real GDP. 
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